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Abstract
This thesis comprises three chapters on macroeconomics. Chapter 1 studies a para-
dox of precaution in international saving. In partial equilibrium, a small open e-
conomy that accumulates savings during good times can mitigate consumption falls
during bad times. This chapter shows that, in general equilibrium, the opposite
may be true if the amount of savings is large enough. More savings require more
borrowing and higher leverage in the rest of the world, making it more prone to a
financial crisis. Crises in the rest of the world then feed back to the saving economies
and destabilize them. If the saving economies are collectively large but individual-
ly small, their national policymakers will not fully internalize the negative general
equilibrium effect. Thus, in equilibrium, there will be excessive global imbalances
and excessive volatility for the savers themselves.
Chapter 2 studies consumption-led growth. Investment is bounded by retained
earnings for young firms relying on self-financing. The firms are underinvesting from
the perspective of a constrained social planner who cannot inject funds to the self-
financing firms directly, for two reasons. First, households do not internalize that
additional consumption and labor supply increases the profits of the self-financing
firms. Second, firms with credit access do not internalize that their expansion fueled
by credit intensifies competition in the factor market, drives up factor prices, and
squeezes the profits of self-financing firms. The social planner optimally chooses
“pro-consumption” policies such as a consumption subsidy and a saving tax on the
household to increase the consumption demand and the cost of credit. More con-
sumption paradoxically leads to more investment and output for the self-financing
firms.
Chapter 3 studies population aging with automation. This chapter develops a
dynamic model that combines demographic transitions, as in Gertler (1999), with
endogenous automation. Following Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b), automation is
modeled as the active replacement of labor with capital at the task level in response
to a rise in the relative cost of labor to capital, leading to an endogenous increase
in the capital share of output. It finds that allowing automation to react endoge-
nously to demographic and productivity changes generates quantitatively relevant
effects compared with the standard baseline where firms cannot respond through
the automation margin.
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Chapter 1
When Being Thrifty is Risky: A
Paradox of Precaution in
International Saving
Abstract: In partial equilibrium, a small open economy that accumulates savings
during good times can mitigate consumption falls during bad times. This chapter
shows that, in general equilibrium, the opposite may be true if the amount of savings
is large enough. More savings require more borrowing and higher leverage in the rest
of the world, making it more prone to a financial crisis. Crises in the rest of the world
then feed back to the saving economies and destabilize them. If the saving economies
are collectively large but individually small, their national policymakers will not fully
internalize the negative general equilibrium effect. Thus, in equilibrium, there will
be excessive global imbalances and excessive volatility for the savers themselves.
1.1 Introduction
The emerging Asian economies recently became major contributors to the global
imbalances. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, they switched from running small
current account deficits to large surpluses (Figure 1.1). While there are multiple
explanations behind this “global saving glut” (Bernanke, 2005), the self-insurance
motive is a key driving factor (Aizenman and Lee (2007); Calvo et al. (2012); Ghosh
et al. (2014)). By contrast, the Anglo-American economies at the center of the
international financial system have run large current account deficits. Their current
account positions started to deteriorate significantly after 1997 and bottomed at
-5% of their GDP in 2006 just before the global financial crisis. Thereafter, they
borrowed an extra 2.5% of their GDP (approximately) each year, which is twice
the pre-1997 level. In part, this could reflect their superior financial development,
including a comparative advantage in producing riskless assets (Gourinchas et al.,
2017). Their assets provide saving vehicles for consumption smoothing (Caballero
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et al., 2008) and insurance instruments for risk-sharing (Mendoza et al., 2009) to
the less financially developed rest of the world.
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Figure 1.1: Global saving glut: surplus periphery and deficit center
This chapter asks the following question: to what extent is the strategy of saving
for self-insurance effective in a world of large global imbalances? There are two
competing forces when the savers are not small. First, more savings provide larger
buffers against bad shocks and enhance economic stability directly. This is the
positive direct effect as conventionally understood. Second, more savings require
more borrowing and higher leverage in the rest of the world, rendering it more
prone to a financial crisis. Crises in the rest of the world, when materialize, feed
back to the saving economies and destabilize them indirectly. This negative general
equilibrium (GE) effect, highlighted in this chapter, can overturn the positive direct
effect of extra buffers. That is, higher savings can increase rather than decrease the
volatility of the saving economies, making the self-insurance strategy self-defeating.
I call this case a “paradox of precaution” in international saving.
This chapter leads to both positive and normative results. From a positive
perspective, it shows that there is a paradox of precaution if the saving economies
are not small. Intuitively, the negative GE effect is large if the saving economies
are large, when their savings drive up leverage ratios in the rest of the world to a
crisis-prone level. My quantitative model suggests that this might happen in the
late 2010s.
From a normative perspective, it calls for international cooperation among the
national policymakers in the surplus economies to rebalance their external positions
for their own economic stability. An individual surplus economy such as China,
Germany, or Japan only contributes to a fraction of the global imbalances. There-
fore, each national policymaker does not fully internalize the negative GE effect.
As a result, the saving glut economies acting individually saves more than acting
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collectively. The symptom is excessive global imbalances, and the consequence is
excessive volatility for the savers themselves.
The 2008 global financial crisis could be a suggestive example of a large GE
effect. As shown in Figure 1.2, Germany and Japan, which were among the main
contributors to the global imbalances, fell into recessions in 2009. The recessions
were even deeper than in the US, which was the epicenter of the global financial
crisis. The growth rate of mainland China, which was another main contributor
to the global imbalances, dropped by more than 5% from its pre-crisis peak. The
European debt crisis in the early 2010s is yet another suggestive example of a large
GE effect at work, even though the savers are more financially developed than the
borrowers. Following the introduction of the Euro, Germany saved significantly in
the southern European economies, expecting high returns. However, the consequent
debt crisis in Greece and the uncertainty about the sustainability of the Eurozone
drove Germany itself to the brink of recession during 2012 and 2013.
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Figure 1.2: Growth rate for CHN, DEU, JPN and the USA in the global financial
crisis
To begin with, this chapter presents an analytical two-country Lucas-tree model
with collateral constraints to disentangle the direct and GE effects. The analytical
model is then enriched with endogenous labor supply and production for quanti-
tative analysis. In the model, financial crises in the borrowing economies, which
come from the financial accelerator of the binding financial constraints reinforced
by the fire sale of collateral a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), destabilize the saving
economies through a contraction of the bond supply. More specifically, a decrease in
the supply of bond prevents the saving economies from rolling over their savings. It
disrupts consumption smoothing over time and across different states. The borrow-
ing economies are more likely to deleverage in the first place, and in such a situation
they deleverage more heavily, if additional savings from the saving economies drive
up their average leverage ratios. As a result, higher savings increase the volatility
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of the saving economies through the general equilibrium effect. Consistently, Table
1.1 shows that there were large declines in the US riskless bond supplies around
the global financial crisis when presumably riskless assets lost their “safe haven”
status. The same applied to the early 2010s European debt crisis when even some
government bonds were reconsidered as risky.
Table 1.1: A list of riskless assets: pre- and post-crisis in billions of US dollars
Year
2007 2011
US Federal government debt held by public 5, 136 10, 692
Held by the Federal Reserve 736 1, 700
Held by private investors 4, 401 8, 992
Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) obligations 2, 910 2, 023
Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools 4, 464 6, 283
Private-issue asset-backed security (ABS) 3, 901 1, 277
Total safe asset held by private investors 15, 676 8, 992
Source: Barclays Capital (2012). The data come from Federal Reserve Flow of
Funds, Haver Analytics and Barclays Capital. Numbers are struck through if the
corresponding securities are believed to have lost their “safe haven” status after
2007.
It is worth noting that there are various spillback channels that count toward
the negative GE effect other than the contraction of bond supply. For example, the
collapse of trade, the flight of capital, the interruption of financial services provided
by the core countries, or the loss from an outright default all transmit crises from the
borrowing to the saving economies. Adding these additional spillback mechanisms
will only enhance the GE effect and therefore make the paradox of precaution more
likely, which strengthens my result. These channels are not included in this chapter
for simplicity. Rather than emphasizing a specific new spillback channel per se, this
chapter aims to highlight the possibility that the negative GE effect can dominate
the positive direct effect.
This chapter contributes to four strands of literature. First, it extends the
sudden-stop and capital control literature by going beyond the small open economy
framework. The sudden-stop literature models infrequent crises using occasionally
binding collateral constraint, which is also developed in this chapter. The literature
generally draws the conclusion that the economies borrow too much or save too
little ex-ante due to a fire-sale externality (for example, Bianchi (2011), Jeanne and
Korinek (2010), Mendoza (2010). Benigno et al. (2013) and Jeanne and Korinek
(2013) draw opposite conclusions by emphasizing ex-post policies.). For tractability,
the literature uses the small open economy framework in which the international
conditions are taken as given. This chapter shows that, the opposite may be true if
the interactions between home and foreign economies are modeled explicitly.
Second, the chapter enriches the literature on global imbalances by explicitly s-
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tudying government policies. The global imbalances literature proposes some expla-
nations in which the imbalances are desirable outcomes from the asymmetry in the
development of the financial system and other dimensions (for example, Caballero
et al. (2008), Jin (2012), Mendoza et al. (2009)). In particular, the economies at
the center of the international financial system provide insurance to the economies
at the periphery, fulfilling an “exorbitant duty”, in exchange for the “exorbitant
privilege” of low financing cost (Gourinchas et al., 2017). In this chapter, a lack of
international cooperation among the periphery economies leads to excessive savings
and risks for themselves. The global imbalances are undesirably large for the savers.
Third, it supplements the paradox of global thrift literature by providing an
alternative channel of self-defeating savings. In the literature following Keynes,
large savings in a few economies lead to an undesirable global liquidity trap that
reduces global output (Caballero et al. (2016), Caballero and Farhi (2017), Fornaro
and Romei (2018)). This chapter does not involve the zero lower bound of nominal
interest rates. It deviates from the literature further by focusing on the consumption
volatility rather than the output levels, for the savers rather than the borrowers, as
a consequence of additional savings.
Fourth, it complements the Triffin dilemma literature (Farhi and Maggiori (2017),
Bordo and McCauley (2018)), which focuses on the deficit economies that provide
reserve/safe assets to the rest of the world. A Triffin dilemma suggests that the
global demand for reserve/safe assets will either remain dangerously unsatisfied or
force excessive US money/debt, which is self-defeating for the reserve/safe asset s-
tatus. My model argues that large savings are also self-defeating for the surplus
economies. The more indebted the US is, the more likely it is to deleverage and
reduce safe asset supply.
This chapter labels with a new term “paradox of precaution” the situation that
the self-insurance by accumulating assets becomes self-defeating through the GE
effect. It is a different concept to the seemingly related “paradox of prudence”
coined in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016). The “paradox of prudence” refers to
the situation that a fire sale of risky assets by the prudent investors endogenously
increases the riskiness of the asset.
The rest of the chapter will be organized as follows: in Section Two, I introduce
an analytical model and disentangle the direct and GE effects; in Section Three I
construct a quantitative model and discuss the numerical method and calibration;
in Section Four I conduct a positive analysis of the effect of a saving tax on economic
volatility; in Section Five I conduct a normative analysis of the optimal saving tax,
depending on whether the GE effect is ignored or internalized; and Section Six
concludes.
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1.2 Analytical model
This section builds a tractable model to disentangle the direct and general equilib-
rium (GE) effects of additional savings on the consumption smoothing of the saver.
The environment is a two-country-Lucas-tree economy without any random shock.
By assuming away shocks, the model becomes analytically tractable. This assump-
tion will be relaxed in the next section to allow a generalization of the intuition from
consumption smoothing to economic stabilizing.
The world economy consists of two countries: home and foreign. In each of
the two countries, a representative consumer lives for three periods: today, tomor-
row, and the future. The representative consumer makes consumption, domestic
investment, and international saving decisions. She can invest in dividend-paying
trees (with fixed supply) domestically. She can also trade a one-period riskless bond
internationally. An international bond issuance must be backed by domestic tree
collateral. Restricting the tree market to be domestic not only simplifies the analysis
but also reflects the equity home bias in reality.
The two economies differ by the dividend processes of their trees. In particular,
the foreign trees yield little dividend in the future, causing a potentially low future
consumption that motivates savings today and tomorrow. To clear the market, the
home economy borrows. This leads to a global imbalance between home and for-
eign. In reality, the fast aging economies such as China, Japan and Germany, and the
oil exporters receiving windfall can be captured by such dividend processes. They
are indeed large savers. The ultimate source of the global imbalances is, however,
inessential for the mechanism highlighted in this section. I call the borrowing econ-
omy “home” and the saving economy “foreign” to follow the convention of calling
the US “home”.
1.2.1 Home consumer’s problem
Formally, the representative home consumer solves the following problem.
max logC1 + β logC2 + β
2 logC3
s.t.
C1 + (K1 −K0)Q1 +B1P1 = K0d1 +B0 (1.1)
C2 + (K2 −K1)Q2 +B2P2 = K1d2 +B1 (1.2)
−B2P2 ≤ φK2Q2 (1.3)
C3 = K2d3 +B2 (1.4)
Each tree yields dt units of output at time t. The consumer uses the dividends
from the tree Kt−1dt and the bond repayment Bt−1 to consume Ct, to purchase new
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trees Kt −Kt−1 at price Qt and to purchase new bond Bt at price Pt. The initial
bond position is zero B0 = 0 and the initial quantity of trees is K0. If Bt > 0, the
consumer purchases bond, and if Bt < 0, the consumer issues bond. The future
period is the final period. Therefore, trees have zero residual value and bond cannot
be issued.
The home economy cannot issue riskless bond −B2P2 tomorrow1 more than a
small2 fraction φ of its tree collateral K2Q2. The collateral constraint comes from a
limited enforcement problem a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The home borrower
cannot commit to repay so they pledge their trees as collateral. While foreign lenders
cannot operate home trees, they can temporarily seize a fraction φ of the defaulting
home borrower’s trees and sell them at the market price. To ensure repayment, the
foreign lenders will not lend more than the liquidation value of the collateral φK2Q2.
In reality, safe bonds can be issued by the private sector and the government subject
to explicit and implicit collateral constraints. I do not distinguish them in the model.
The trees are in fixed supply. Normalize the number of home trees to be 1. The
tree market clears as follows.
Kt = 1, ∀t = 0, 1, 2.
The Euler equations for tree and bond tomorrow are the following, respectively.
Q2 (1− φµ2) = βC2
C3
d3 (1.5)
P2 (1− µ2) = βC2
C3
(1.6)
µ2 ≥ 0 is the shadow price of relaxing the collateral constraint (normalized by
the shadow price of relaxing the budget constraint). If the collateral constraint is not
binding, the shadow price is zero µ2 = 0. The asset prices Q2,, P2 are the discounted
values of future payoffs. The future payoff for the trees only involves the future
dividend d3 because the trees have zero residual value after the final period. If the
collateral constraint is binding, the shadow price is positive µ2 > 0. The asset prices
are higher than the discounted future payoffs because an additional unit of tree or
bond holding relaxes the collateral constraint.
When the collateral constraint is not binding, eliminating C2 and C3 from equa-
1For simplicity, assume there is no constraint for today’s issuance. Alternatively, assume the
constraint for today is not binding.
2The pledgeability φ cannot be too large. In this model, φ < 1/ (1 + β). Otherwise, an equi-
librium might not exist when the legacy debt is large. To show this, assume the home collateral
constraint is not binding and solve the bond position and the collateral price. It is a contradiction
as the collateral constraint is violated. Intuitively, to roll over a large legacy debt, current borrow-
ing has to be large, which is not feasible. Then assume the home collateral constraint is binding.
However, the equilibrium Lagrangian multiplier µ2 is negative. It is again a contradiction. Intu-
itively, the consumer values the collateral so much given its large pledgeability that the collateral
constraint becomes slack.
15
tions (1.2), (1.4) and (1.6) using µ2 = 0, the bond position tomorrow relates to bond
position today as follows.
−B2P2 = d3P2 + β (−B1 − d2)
(1 + β)
(1.7)
From the expression, the economy issues more bond (−B2P2 larger) this period if it
is more indebted (−B1 larger) in the previous period. It rolls over the debt.
When the collateral constraint is binding and µ2 > 0, eliminating µ2, Q2, C2, C3
from equations (1.2), (1.3 with equality), (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), the bond position
tomorrow relates to bond position today as follows.
−B2P2 = β (d2 − (−B1))
1/φ− (1 + β) (1.8)
The denominator is positive from the assumption that the pledgeability is not too
large φ < 1/ (1 + β). So, the economy borrows less (−B2P2 smaller) this period if it
is more indebted (−B1 larger) in the previous period. It has a debt consolidation.
Intuitively, to pay back a larger maturing debt (−B1 larger), the economy has
to sell trees. But the quantity of the trees is fixed in equilibrium. Consequently,
the tree price falls (Q2 lower) and the collateral constraint tightens. Even less debt
can be issued (−B2P2 smaller). It triggers another round of fire sale, so on and so
forth. The economy is in a financial crisis a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). More
specifically, from equations (1.2) and (1.8), when the collateral constraint is binding,
tomorrow’s consumption C2 is a multiple
1/φ−1
1/φ−(1+β) > 1 of resources available B1+d2.
C2 =
1/φ− 1
1/φ− (1 + β) (B1 + d2)
Consumption falls more than one-to-one with a fall of dividend d2 or resources
available B1 + d2.
From equations (1.2), (1.3), (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), the collateral constraint is
binding when
d2 < −B1 + (1/φ− (1 + β))φ/βP2d3. (1.9)
If the economy is more indebted (−B1 larger), a deleverage is more likely (the
constraint is binding when −B1 is large enough from equation 1.9) and more heavily
(the deleverage 1 − B2P2/B1 is larger from equation 1.8). This is a key building
block of the GE effect.
1.2.2 Foreign consumer’s problem
The representative foreign consumer solves a similar problem.
max logC∗1 + β logC
∗
2 + β
2 logC∗3
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s.t.
C∗1 + (K
∗
1 −K∗0 )Q∗1 +B∗1P1 (1 + τ∗) = K∗0d∗1 +B∗0 + T ∗ (1.10)
C∗2 + (K
∗
2 −K∗1 )Q∗2 +B∗2P2 = K∗1d∗2 +B∗1 (1.11)
C∗3 = K
∗
2d3 +B
∗
2 (1.12)
The variables of the foreign consumer are denoted with asterisk superscripts.
The foreign problem resembles the home problem except for two differences. First,
the consumer faces a saving tax that is fully rebated today.
B∗1P1τ
∗ = T ∗.
The saving tax affects the equilibrium saving choice today B∗1 directly and the
consumption in the future C∗3 indirectly. The instrument is introduced to allow
the analysis of additional savings, which is ultimately induced by the tax. Second,
as a saver, the consumer’s collateral constraints are never binding and are therefore
dropped.
The consumer saves tomorrow if the output d3 is small in the future. Formally,
a not very restrictive sufficient condition for B∗2 > 0 is d∗3/d3 < min (d∗1/d2, d∗2/d2).
I assume so. If the foreign-to-home relative output in the future is lower than today
and tomorrow, the foreign consumer should save at least tomorrow for the future.
For ease of interpretation, I also assume that d∗1 is not too small so that the foreign
consumer saves both today and tomorrow. Both assumptions will be relaxed in the
quantitative model.
The trees are in fixed supply K∗. It captures the relative size of the foreign
economy to the home economy, in which the quantity of trees is normalized to 1.
The tree market clears as follows.
K∗t = K
∗, ∀t = 0, 1, 2
The Euler equation for bond tomorrow is the following.
P2 = β
C∗2
C∗3
(1.13)
Likewise, eliminating C∗2 and C∗3 from equations (1.11), (1.12) and (1.13), the
bond position tomorrow relates to the bond position today as follows.
B∗2P2 =
β (B∗1 +K∗d∗2)−K∗d∗3P2
(1 + β)
(1.14)
The world bond market clearing condition closes the model.
Bt +B
∗
t = 0, ∀t = 1, 2. (1.15)
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For a given foreign saving tax τ∗, a general equilibrium is defined as a set of
domestic tree prices Qt, Q
∗
t and international bond prices Pt such that (1) the con-
sumption Ct, C
∗
t , the bond positions Bt, B
∗
t and the tree positions Kt,K
∗
t solve the
home and foreign consumers’ problem; (2) the two domestic tree markets and the
world bond market clears.
1.2.3 Results
The foreign savings today B∗1 are endogenous for an exogenously given τ∗. But
it is equivalent and more convenient to treat τ∗ as endogenous for an exogenously
given B∗1 . The consumption smoothing involves saving today B∗1 and rolls over the
savings tomorrow for future consumption C∗3 . This section shows the consequence
of an additional unit of foreign bond B∗1 today (induced by τ∗ change) on the future
foreign consumption C∗3 .
Lemma 1. The foreign economy cannot roll over its savings from today to tomorrow
if the home economy deleverages and fails to roll over its debt (dB∗2/dB∗1 < 0 if µ2 >
0). The foreign economy can roll over its savings from today to tomorrow otherwise
(dB∗2/dB∗1 > 0 if µ2 = 0).
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
The lemma reveals that more savings today lead to fewer savings tomorrow for
the foreign economy if the home economy deleverages. The home deleverage prevents
it from rolling over its debt. This, in turn, creates an asset shortage and prevents
the foreign economy from rolling over the savings.
Proposition 2. Additional savings today exacerbate the foreign economy consump-
tion fall in the future if the home economy deleverages tomorrow (dC∗3/dB∗1 <
0 if µ2 > 0). Additional savings today mitigate the foreign economy consumption
fall in the future otherwise (dC∗3/dB∗1 > 0 if µ2 = 0).
Proof. From equation (1.12), dC∗3/dB∗2 > 0. The results follow Lemma 1.
The proposition reveals the possibility of a foreign paradox of savings. Additional
foreign savings today can lead to lower consumption in the future. It is self-defeating
for the purpose of consumption smoothing.
Lemma 3. In the laissez-faire equilibrium, the home economy deleverages tomorrow
(µ2 > 0) if the foreign economy is relatively large K
∗ > Kˆ∗, where Kˆ∗solves
1
1 + β + β2
(
(1 + β)− (1 +K
∗d∗3/d3)
(1 +K∗d∗1/d1)
− β (1 +K
∗d∗3/d3)
(1 +K∗d∗2/d2)
)
= φ
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Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
If the foreign economy is large it demands lots of home assets. The home economy
is, in turn, more indebted today and more likely to deleverage tomorrow.
Proposition 4. Additional savings than the laissez-faire equilibrium today exac-
erbate the foreign economy consumption fall in the future if its size is relatively
large (dC∗3/dB∗1 < 0 if K∗ > Kˆ∗). Additional savings than the laissez-faire equi-
librium today mitigate the foreign economy consumption fall in the future otherwise
(dC∗3/dB∗1 > 0 if K∗ < Kˆ∗).
Proof. Combine Proposition 2 and Lemma 3.
A paradox of saving appears when the foreign economy is relatively large. In
reality, the savers are growing faster than the borrowers, as shown in Appendix 1.B.
Following the proposition, a paradox of saving will be increasingly relevant in the
future, if not already now.
Due to the rare nature of a financial crisis and identification problems, it is diffi-
cult to test the paradox empirically. For anecdotal evidence, the 2008 global financial
crisis is a recent scenario in which the financial crises from borrowing economies (the
US and the UK), to which the global saving glut (from China, Japan, Germany, and
the oil exporters) contributed3, destabilized the saving economies themselves.
Theorem 5. The net effect of additional savings today on the foreign economy
future consumption can be decomposed to a direct effect and a general equilibrium
(GE) effect.
dC∗3
dB∗1
=
∂C∗3
∂B∗1
∣∣∣∣
P2︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+
∂C∗3
∂B∗2
∂B∗2
∂P2
dP2
dB∗1︸ ︷︷ ︸
GE effect
The GE effect is negative if the home economy deleverages tomorrow and zero
otherwise (
∂C∗3
∂B∗2
∂B∗2
∂P2
dP2
dB∗1
< 0 if µ2 > 0 and
∂C∗3
∂B∗2
∂B∗2
∂P2
dP2
dB∗1
= 0 if µ2 = 0). The direct
effect is always positive (
∂C∗3
∂B∗1
∣∣∣
P2
> 0).
Proof. The decomposition results from applying the chain rule.
∂C∗3
∂B∗2
∂B∗2
∂P2
< 0 comes
from equations (1.12) and (1.14). The dP2/dB
∗
1 > 0 for µ2 > 0 case results from
eliminating B2 and B
∗
2 from equations (1.8), (1.14) and (1.15). The dP2/dB
∗
1 = 0
for µ2 = 0 case results from eliminating B2 and B
∗
2 from equations (1.7), (1.14) and
(1.15). ∂C∗3/∂B∗1 |P2 > 0 results from equations (1.12) and (1.14).
3The financial innovation and regulation failures also contributed to the crisis
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The direct effect is the effect of additional savings with an infinitely elastic bond
supply at a fixed bond price P2. The direct effect always improves consumption
smoothing. Intuitively, if the bond price is fixed, nothing discourages the foreign
economy from rolling over its savings tomorrow.
The GE effect is the effect of additional savings from a potentially higher tomor-
row bond price P2 induced by the deleverage and contraction of asset supply in a
financial crisis of the rest of the world. The GE effect is negative or zero. Intuitively,
the lower tomorrow’s interest rate is (P2 larger), the smaller the savings (B
∗
2 smaller)
are and hence the lower future consumption (C∗3 smaller) is. If the home economy
deleverages tomorrow, the safe asset shortage drives up the bond price. Additional
foreign savings today unintendedly trigger a more severe home deleverage tomorrow
and hence a higher bond price. If the home economy does not deleverage tomorrow,
the perfect consumption co-movements of the home and foreign economies between
tomorrow and the future pins down the world bond price, regardless of the saving
decision today.
The GE effect can overturn the conventional wisdom of saving for a rainy day.
The net effect depends crucially on the relative magnitude of the direct and GE
effects. In this model, the GE effect is so large that it always dominates the direct
effect if the home economy deleverages tomorrow.
What’s more, the decomposition reveals the possibility of excessive global im-
balances. If the negative GE effect is ignored, a foreign policymaker thinks that
additional savings always increase its future consumption. It saves more than that
if it internalizes the negative GE effect4. In reality, the saving economies are collec-
tively large but individually small. The major contributors of the global imbalances
such as China, Germany, and Japan all have similar surpluses. The policymakers in
these economies are likely to not fully internalize the negative GE effect, creating
excessive global imbalances.
1.3 Quantitative model
I set up an international business cycle model with financial frictions. It extends the
discussion from consumption smoothing to economic stabilizing, and quantifies the
conditions for the paradox of precaution to appear.
The environment is a stochastic two-country-production economy with an infi-
nite horizon. There is, again, one home economy and one foreign economy of which
variables are denoted with asterisk superscripts. But they have infinite horizons.
The output is not the exogenous dividend from the trees anymore, but is produced
with land and labor. Land, like the tree in the analytical model, is traded domes-
tically. A one-period riskless bond is traded internationally. The total debt cannot
exceed a fraction of the land collateral for the same enforcement reasons. The two
4The home consumption smoothing is also interrupted from too much debt.
20
economies have similar consumption smoothing problems subject to similar budget
constraints and credit constraints. They are calibrated asymmetrically to reflect the
global imbalances from (1) tighter financial constraint in the foreign economy and
(2) higher variance of productivity shock in the foreign economy with details in the
calibration section.
1.3.1 Consumer-entrepreneur’s problem
1.3.1.1 Home economy
The representative home consumer-entrepreneur solves the following problem.
Vt = maxEj
∞∑
t=j
βt−j
(
Ct − χ (L
s
t )
1+ω
1+ω
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ
s.t.
Ct +Qt (Kt −Kt−1) + PtBt = WtLst +Bt−1 +
(
ZtK
α
t−1
(
Ldt
)γ −WtLdt)
−PtBt + θWtLdt ≤ φQtKt
The consumer-entrepreneur values consumption Ct and dislikes working L
s
t fol-
lowing the Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman specification (Greenwood et al. (1988)).
This formulation of preferences removes the income effect on the labor supply
by making the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor de-
pends on the labor only. The consumer-entrepreneur receives income from work-
ing Lst at wage Wt, bond repayment Bt−1, and revenue from operating the firm
ZtK
α
t−1
(
Ldt
)γ−WtLdt . The firm produces output using land Kt−1 and labor Ldt with
a Cobb-Douglas production function of productivity Zt. The proceeds are used to
consume, purchase new land Kt −Kt−1 at price Qt and purchase new bond Bt at
price Pt. The intertemporal debt −PtBt, plus the intratemporal debt to finance the
working capital requirement θWtL
d
t , cannot exceed a fraction φ of the land value
QtKt. If the bond position is positive, the financial constraint should be interpreted
as that the working capital debt is collateralized against the domestic land and the
international reserves in bond θWtL
d
t ≤ φQtKt + PtBt.
1.3.1.2 Foreign economy
Likewise, the representative foreign consumer-entrepreneur has a problem with the
same structure as in the home economy.
V ∗t = maxEj
∞∑
t=j
(β∗)t−j
(
C∗t − χ∗ (L
s∗
t )
1+ω∗
1+ω∗
)1−σ∗
− 1
1− σ∗
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s.t.
C∗t +Q
∗
t
(
K∗t −K∗t−1
)
+Pt (1 + τ
∗)B∗t = W
∗
t L
s∗
t +B
∗
t−1+
(
Z∗t
(
K∗t−1
)α∗ (
Ld∗t
)γ∗ −W ∗t Ld∗t )+T ∗t
−PtB∗t + θ∗W ∗t Ld∗t ≤ φ∗Q∗tK∗t
The only difference is that their savings are taxed at a constant rate τ∗, chosen by
the government. A positive τ∗ raises the effective price of bond and discourages
saving. A negative τ∗, instead, reduces the effective price of bond and encourages
saving. The tax revenue is fully rebated through a lump-sum transfer.
T ∗t = τ
∗PtB∗t .
In practice, a positive τ∗ captures the effect of capital outflow controls. A neg-
ative τ∗ captures the reserve accumulations by the central bank plus capital inflow
controls. More specifically, the central bank issues papers or sells government bond
to domestic agents and uses the proceeds to invest in international reserve assets.
The interest rate of international reserve assets is usually lower than the domestic
government bond or central bank liabilities. The difference is the saving subsidy τ∗.
The capital inflow control rules out arbitrage.
1.3.1.3 Market clearing conditions
Each economy’s land is in fixed supply. The land market clears in the home and
foreign economies as follows.
Kt = K
K∗t = K
∗
The labor market clears in the home and foreign economies as follows.
Lst = L
d
t
Ls∗t = L
d∗
t
The world bond market clears as follows.
Bt + nB
∗
t = 0,
where n is the population of the foreign economy as a multiple of the home economy.
1.3.1.4 Equilibrium conditions
The optimal conditions for the foreign economy are the following.
W ∗t = χ
∗ (Ls∗t )
ω∗
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The foreign consumer supply labor until its disutility from working equals the utility
from extra consumption. The labor supply increases with the wage.
γ∗Z∗t
(
K∗t−1
)α∗ (
Ld∗t
)γ∗−1
= (1 + µ∗t θ
∗)W ∗t
The foreign entrepreneur’s labor demand equals the marginal output and marginal
cost of labor. µ∗t ≥ 0 is the shadow price of relaxing the financial constraint (nor-
malized by the shadow price of relaxing the budget constraint). The marginal cost
of labor could be higher than wage because it tightens the financial constraint.
Q∗t (1− φ∗µ∗t ) = Etβ∗
C∗t+1 − χ∗ (Ls∗t+1)
1+ω∗
1+ω∗
C∗t − χ∗ (L
s∗
t )
1+ω∗
1+ω∗

−σ∗ (
Q∗t+1 + α
∗Z∗t+1 (K
∗
t )
α∗−1
(
Ld∗t+1
)γ∗)
The land price equals the discounted future land price and rents if the financial
constraint is not binding. It exceeds the discounted future payoffs if the financial
constraint is binding because land provides additional benefit of relaxing the financial
constraint.
Pt (1 + τ
∗
t − µ∗t ) = Etβ∗
C∗t+1 − χ∗ (Ls∗t+1)
1+ω∗
1+ω∗
C∗t − χ∗ (L
s∗
t )
1+ω∗
1+ω∗

−σ∗
The bond price equals discounted future unit repayment if the financial constraint
is not binding. It exceeds the discounted future payoff if the financial constraint is
binding because bond provides additional benefit of relaxing the financial constraint.
A tax makes the bond less attractive and its price is lower.
The complementary slackness condition for the financial constraint is the follow-
ing.
µ∗t
(
φ∗Q∗tK
∗
t + PtB
∗
t − θ∗W ∗t Ld∗t
)
= 0 and µ∗t ≥ 0
The shadow price is positive if the constraint is binding and is otherwise zero.
The home consumer-entrepreneur’s maximizing problem yields the same sets of
optimal conditions without a saving tax in the bond Euler equation.
Wt = χ (L
s
t )
ω
γZt (Kt−1)α
(
Ldt
)γ−1
= (1 + µtθ)Wt
Qt (1− φµt) = Etβ
Ct+1 − χ(Lst+1)
1+ω
1+ω
Ct − χ (L
s
t )
1+ω
1+ω

−σ (
Qt+1 + αZt+1 (Kt)
α−1
(
Ldt+1
)γ)
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Pt (1− µt) = Etβ
Ct+1 − χ(Lst+1)
1+ω
1+ω
Ct − χ (L
s
t )
1+ω
1+ω

−σ
µt
(
φQtKt + PtBt − θWtLdt
)
= 0 and µt ≥ 0
An equilibrium for a given saving tax τ∗ is defined by a set of international bond
price Pt, domestic land price Qt, Q
∗
t and wage Wt,W
∗
t such that (1) the consumption
Ct, C
∗
t , the bond positions Bt, B
∗
t the land positions Kt,K
∗
t , the labor supply L
s
t , L
s∗
t ,
and labor demand Ldt , L
d∗
t solve the problems of the consumer-entrepreneurs in the
home and foreign economies; (2) the domestic land markets and labor markets clear;
and (3) the international bond market clears.
1.3.2 Numerical Algorithm
The model is solved by a global, nonlinear solution method for two reasons. First,
financial crises are infrequent events during which the binding financial constraint
reinforces the initial fall in consumption and collateral price from a bad shock.
Second, the consumer-entrepreneurs make portfolio choices between the safe bond
and the risky land so that a nonstochastic steady state cannot be well defined.
The global solution is solved by iterating on the optimal conditions following
Coleman (1990)’s time iteration algorithm. The algorithm starts by guessing the
policy functions for the next period variables and solves the policy functions for
current period variables. It then updates the policy functions for the next period
variables using the solution and repeats the process until it converges. The details
of the algorithm are described in Appendix 1.D.
For the tricky issue of two occasionally binding constraints, which leads to four
binding-nonbinding combinations for each state in each iteration of the time iteration
algorithm, I apply a transformation of the complementary slackness conditions to
get rid of it. The complementary slackness condition in the form of µ = 0, µ ≥
0, X ≥ 0 is transformed to µ = max(0, µˆ3), X = max(0,−µˆ3) by introducing an
auxiliary variable µˆ ∈ (−∞,∞). The transformation satisfies the complementary
slackness condition by construction and the new auxiliary variable does not have any
restrictions of its value. The forward-looking equation system can then be treated as
those without inequality conditions. It is worth noting that the auxiliary variable is
raised to the cubic power to ensure that the second-order derivatives almost always
exist. This facilitates root-finding using the fast Newton methods in each iteration.
I further implement an adaptive grid method to improve precision and use par-
allelization to improve speed. The model is hence solved fairly accurately according
to the Euler equation error within a reasonable time. This allows me to proceed to
the comparative static analysis, in which the model needs to be solved many times
for different parameterizations. The details are in Appendix 1.D.
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1.3.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model to the US and China annually. The home economy refers to
the deficit economies represented by the US and the foreign economy refers to the
surplus economies represented by China. Table 3.1 summarizes the calibration.
Table 1.2: Calibration
Parameter Description Value Source/Target
β,β∗ discount rate 0.96 standard
σ, σ∗ relative risk aversion 2 standard
γ ,γ∗ labor share 2/3 standard
χ, χ∗ labor disutility coefficient 2/3 normalization
K, K∗ quantity of asset 1 normalization
α,α∗ asset share 0.05 normalization, US QK/GDP = 1.25
ω, ω∗ inverse Frisch elasticity of labor 1 Kimball and Shapiro (2008)
φ pledgeability 0.29 tar. US freq. crisis 0.03
φ∗ pledgeability 0.1 tar. NIIP ∗/GDP ∗ = 0.4
θγ working capital coefficient 0.15 cal. M1/GDP = 0.15
θ∗γ∗ working capital coefficient 0.5 cal. M∗1 /GDP
∗ = 0.5
Z mean productivity 1 normalization
Z
∗
mean productivity 0.25 tar. GDP ∗/GDP = 0.5
n foreign population 4 cal. CN/US population
ρ persistence of log productivity 0.55 tar. US log GDP autocorr 0.54
σZ stderr of shock to log productivity 0.012 tar. US log GDP stderr 0.021
ρ∗ persistence of log productivity 0.79 tar. CN log GDP autocorr 0.73
σ∗Z stderr of shock to log productivity 0.0155 tar. CN log GDP stderr 0.030
A few parameters are standard in quantitative DSGE models. The discount rate
β is set to 0.96, the relative risk aversion σ is set to 2, and the labor share γ is set
to 2/3. The corresponding foreign variables β∗, σ∗ and γ∗ are set to the same value
as home. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply (1/ω, 1/ω∗) is set to equal to 1, in
line with Kimball and Shapiro (2008).
A few parameters can be normalized. The labor disutility coefficients (χ, χ∗)
are both normalized to the same as labor shares (γ, γ∗). The quantities of fixed
assets (K,K∗) are both normalized to 1. Even if China have different disutility
from working (χ∗ 6= χ) or different fixed assets for collateral (K∗ 6= K) in reality,
the effects will be completely picked up through the calibration of the productivity
processes (Zt, Z
∗
t ). The fixed asset share coefficients (α, α
∗) are set to be 0.05, so
the mean fixed asset value to GDP (approximately α/ (1− β) in the model) is about
1.25, which is roughly the value of residential housing collateral to GDP in the US.
This calibration is neither essential because for any normalization, the effects will
be fully absorbed through calibration of the pledgeability coefficient (φ, φ∗).
Four coefficients for the working capital and pledgeability constraints (θ, θ∗, φ, φ∗)
are specific to my model. The working capital coefficients (θ, θ∗) are calibrated so
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that the working capital to GDP ratios (θγ, θ∗γ∗ in the model) match the cash equiv-
alents M1 to GDP ratios, following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). It captures the
fact that firms need cash or credit lines to pay wage bills and suppliers in advance
and the households need cash or credit cards to purchase goods and services. M1
includes currency or assets that can be quickly converted to cash and are therefore
an appropriate proxy. In the US, the M1 to GDP ratio is around 0.15, and in China,
it is around 0.5. The high demand for cash equivalents in China provides a reason
why it is a net creditor.
The pledgeability coefficient φ∗ for China is difficult to calibrate to micro-level
data due to the high level of aggregation of the model and the wide dispersion in
the loan-to-value restrictions in reality. Instead, it is chosen so that the mean bond
to GDP ratio B∗/Y ∗ matches the net international investment position (NIIP) to
GDP for China. It is around 0.4 in the early 2010s5. China’s GDP is about half of
the US in the early 2010s, this target implies that the US NIIP/GDP will be −0.2
in the absence of other economies. It is indeed the case for the US. The two-country
model works well for the US and China. This approach leads to φ∗ = 0.1.
The pledgeability coefficient φ for the US suffers from the same difficulty to use
micro-level data. Instead, it is calibrated to match the frequency of financial crises
in the US as in Mendoza (2010). To be consistent with the empirical literature, a
financial crisis is an event during which the financial constraint is binding, and the
deleverage exceeds its one standard deviation. Over the last century, the US has
encountered three major financial crises: the great depression, the savings and loan
crisis, and the great recession. By targeting a frequency of crisis of 0.03, the value
of φ is calibrated to be 0.29. It is consistent with the measures of the household and
corporate leverage in the US, varying from 0.2 to 0.45.
The relative population of China to the US is 4 so n = 4. The mean productivity
of the US Z is normalized to be 1 and the mean productivity of China Z
∗
is calibrated
to be 0.25 to target a Chinese GDP as 1/2 of that of the US, which was the case in
the early 2010s.
The log productivity processes are set to follow first-order autoregressive pro-
cesses.
log
(
Zt − Z
)
= ρZ log
(
Zt − Z
)
+ Z
log
(
Z∗t − Z∗
)
= ρ∗Z log
(
Z∗t − Z∗
)
+ ∗Z
Each process is approximated using the quadrature procedure of Tauchen and Hussey
(1991) with 3 nodes. The two shocks are assumed to be completely independent. The
persistence and standard deviation are set to target the business cycle statistics of
log GDP in both economies. The log GDP autocorrelation and standard deviation
5The NIIP of China under consideration sums the separately reported data from mainland China,
the Hong Kong special administrative region of China, the Macau special administrative region of
China, and the Taiwan province of China.
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are calculated from HP filtered log real GDP data in a constant local currency
unit. For the post-war period 1947-2017, the US log GDP has the autocorrelation
0.54 and standard deviation 0.021. For 1980-2017 the Chinese log GDP has the
autocorrelation 0.73 and standard deviation 0.030. The pre-1980s data are not used
as the Chinese economy was mostly central planning during that time. The targets
lead to ρz = 0.55, σz = 0.012, ρ
∗
z = 0.79, σ
∗
z = 0.0155. The log output volatilities are
larger than that of the shocks with the amplification from the financial frictions. The
log output processes are, however, less persistent than that of the shocks because I
abstract away from capital accumulation or capital adjustment cost.
The equilibrium equation system is summarized in Appendix 1.C. In Table 1.3,
I summarize the model moments and the data moments from simulations. The
simulated moments match the corresponding targets fairly well. I also report the
relative volatility of consumption to output for a double-check. While the relative
volatility does not closely follow the longest data series available, which was used as
target of the productivity shock processes, they match the data fairly well for the
recent three decades 1990-2017.
Table 1.3: Model and data moments
Model
Data (detrended with HP filter)
1947-2017 1980-2017 1990-2017
std (log Y ) 0.0215 0.0212 0.0160
autocorr (log Y ) 0.5387 0.5375 0.5942
std (log Y ∗) 0.0302 0.0301 0.0266
autocorr (log Y ∗) 0.7341 0.7393 0.8588
std (logC) /std (log Y ) 1.0283 0.8286 1.0393
std (logC∗) /std (log Y ∗) 0.8664 1.1437 0.8233
The calibration leads to a mean international bond price of 0.965 and mean world
interest rate of 3.6%. This is roughly in line with the long-run real interest rate.
1.4 Positive analyses
This section reports the effect of a saving tax on its consumption volatility for the
foreign economy and how that changes with its relative size. The consumption
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the log consumption adjusted
with the disutility from working (Cˆ∗t ≡ C∗t − χ (L∗t )1+ω
∗
/ (1 + ω∗)) by simulating a
long time series after solving the model globally6. I do not track the probability of a
foreign financial crisis because the foreign economy is almost always a large creditor
from the baseline calibration (NIIP/GDP=40%) and a crisis is hard to define.
6The effect on the unadjusted standard deviation of log consumption is similar. However, the
adjusted ones are more appropriate targets for consumption smoothing in a model with endogenous
labor supply.
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1.4.1 Paradox of precaution
To understand the effect of a foreign saving tax, Figure 1.3 plots adjusted consump-
tion volatility against different saving taxes, for two scenarios. The left panel is for
a “foreign-small” scenario in which the average foreign/home GDP ratio is 0.5 as in
the baseline calibration and the right panel is for a “foreign-large” scenario in which
the average foreign/home GDP ratio is 0.8. There are two main results.
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Figure 1.3: Effect of a foreign saving tax on foreign consumption volatility.
Left panel: foreign-small scenario, Z
∗
/Z = 0.125 so nY ∗/Y = 0.5. Right panel: foreign-large
scenario, Z
∗
/Z = 0.342 so nY ∗/Y = 0.8. Circle marker: laissez-faire equilibrium. Star marker:
the tax for volatility minimizing.
First, around the laissez-faire equilibrium (no tax, marked with a circle) the
consumption volatility increases with the saving tax in the foreign-small scenari-
o but decreases with the saving tax in the foreign-large scenario. The former is
consistent with the conventional wisdom that a saving subsidy enhances economic
stability. The latter shows a paradox of precaution: a saving subsidy increases eco-
nomic volatility. This is consistent with the prediction of the analytical model that
additional savings are bad for consumption smoothing when the saving economy is
large.
Second, both curves are V-shaped. The consumption volatility is decreasing with
the saving tax in the left-part of both panels, while it is increasing in the right-part.
The lowest point of the curve is marked with a star in each panel. When the foreign
economy is small, a saving subsidy of around 0.8 percentage points leads to the
minimum volatility. When the foreign economy is large, a saving tax around 8.7
percentage points leads to the minimum volatility.
To understand the two results, Figures 1.4 and 1.5 augment Figure 1.3 by pro-
viding three additional statistics for the two scenarios: the average external saving
position B∗/Y ∗, the average bond price P , and the probability of a home crisis. To
be consistent with the empirical literature, a home financial crisis is defined as an
event when the financial constraint is binding and the deleverage (Bt−1−BtBt−1 ) exceeds
more than one standard deviation.
An increase of the saving tax reduces the external savings, as shown in the upper-
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right panel. The international bond price decreases consequently as in the lower-left
panel and this induces lower leverage ratios in the home economy. Therefore, the
probability of a home crisis decreases as shown in the lower-right panel.
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Figure 1.4: Effect of a foreign saving tax, foreign-small scenario
Circle marker: laissez-faire equilibrium. Star marker: the tax for volatility minimizing. Foreign
small: Z
∗
/Z = 0.125 so nY ∗/Y = 0.5.
In both figures, when the probability of a home crisis (as shown in the lower-right
panel) is relatively small, which is true when the tax rate is relatively high and the
foreign saving/GDP ratio (home debt/GDP ratio) is relatively low, the volatility-
tax curve is upward-sloping (as shown in the upper-left panel). An increase in
the savings (as shown in the upper-right panel), which is possible when the tax
decreases, reduces the economic volatility (as shown in the upper-left panel). When
the probability of a home crisis is large, which is true when the tax rate is relatively
low and the foreign saving/GDP ratio (home debt/GDP ratio) is relatively high,
the volatility-tax curve is downward-sloping. An increase in the savings, which is
possible when the tax rate further decreases, increases economic volatility.
The probability of a home financial crisis (3% as calibrated) is small around
the laissez-faire equilibrium when the foreign economy is small (GDP 50% of the
home economy). The home debt/GDP ratio is 20% as calibrated. By contrast, the
probability of a home financial crisis (13%) is large around the laissez-faire equi-
librium when the foreign economy is large (GDP 80% of the home economy). The
home debt/GDP ratio, which equals the foreign saving/GDP ratio divided by the
foreign/home GDP ratio to clear the international bond market, is as high as 45%.
Therefore, the volatility-tax curve is upward-sloping around the laissez-faire equilib-
rium with small home leverage and crisis probability. It is instead downward-sloping
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Figure 1.5: Effect of a foreign saving tax, foreign-large scenario
Circle marker: laissez-faire equilibrium. Star marker: the tax for volatility minimizing. Foreign
large: Z
∗
/Z = 0.342 so nY ∗/Y = 0.8
around the laissez-faire equilibrium with large home leverage and crisis probability.
Following the insights from the analytical model, the probability of a home fi-
nancial crisis is large if the foreign economy is large, or a low tax (a large subsidy)
induces the foreign economy to save a lot. There is a large spillover effect from
additional foreign savings to home financial stability when the home leverage is al-
ready high. The destabilizing spillback effect is large, in turn, when the probability
of a home financial crisis is large. As a result, the GE effect is large if the global
imbalances are large and the home economy is crisis-prone.
Why is the magnitude of the spillback effect closely related to the probability of a
home financial crisis? First, a home deleverage event prevents the foreign saver from
rolling over its savings for consumption smoothing. The foreign economy is forced to
increase consumption immediately but reduce consumption thereafter. Second, the
reduced buffers leave the foreign economy vulnerable to the realizations of its shocks.
Third, low saving and low output reinforce each other in the foreign economy when
its financial constraint is binding. The foreign economy, which maintains about 40%
external savings to GDP in the baseline calibration and 36% when its GDP is 80% of
the home economy, is effectively using both the land and the international savings
as collateral for its large working capital requirement by calibration (θ∗W ∗t Ld∗t ≤
φ∗Q∗tK∗t +PtB∗t ). A low supply of asset from the home economy tightens the working
capital constraint and depresses the output in the foreign economy. Being more
indebted, the home economy is more likely to deleverage and in such a situation
deleverages more heavily. As a result, the spillback effect is larger.
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Figure 1.6 plots the ergodic distribution of the home debt position, normalized
by its mean for the foreign-large scenario (the foreign-small scenario is similar). The
normalization facilitates the comparison of the two distributions. Light blue bars
refer to the probability density distribution with the foreign saving tax τ∗ = 0.087
and light red bars refer to the probability distribution for the laissez-faire equilibrium
τ∗ = 0. The foreign saving tax is the tax that minimizes foreign consumption
volatility.
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of normalized bond position, foreign-large scenario
Light blue: saving tax τ∗ = 0.087. Light red: laissez-faire equilibrium.
The distribution of the normalized home debt position is skewed. Its fat tail
comes from the home deleverages reinforced by the fall of consumption and land
price. The deleverages lead to an acute shortage of safe assets and it interrupts
foreign consumption smoothing. The volatility of the home asset supply introduces
volatility into the foreign economy.
Importantly, the variance of the normalized home bond position is smaller with
a foreign saving tax. From Figure 1.5, the foreign saving tax reduces the foreign
saving to GDP ratios from 36% to 31%. This means that the home leverage ratio
reduces from 45% to 39%. As a result, a home deleverage is less likely and less
heavy, which improves foreign economic stability. In the foreign-large scenario, an
8.7 percentage saving tax reduces the volatility of home asset supply to such a degree
that it dominates the adverse direct effect of lower buffers, and the foreign volatility
reduces from 0.0262 to 0.0257.
To further understand how a negative home shock destabilizes the foreign econ-
omy around the laissez-faire equilibrium and the equilibrium with a foreign saving
tax, I conduct an event study for the foreign-large scenario. The event window cov-
ers two years before and after the event. In the calibration, the realizations of the
productivity Z and Z∗ are each discretized to three nodes. So, naturally, there are
good, normal, and bad states for the home economy. I define negative home shock
events as those in the simulations when (1) the state of the current period is bad and
(2) the state of the previous period is either normal or good. The events account
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for 9.8% of all simulations. The medians of the selected variables are reported in
Figure 1.7.
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Figure 1.7: Event study: home bad shock at year 0, foreign-large scenario
Solid blue: saving tax τ∗ = 0.087. Dash red: laissez-faire equilibrium.
The right panel tracks the median productivity of the economies. From the
upper-right panel, the event is indeed a bad shock to the home economy, starting
from a normal state and lasting for one period (in median). The lower-right pan-
el shows that the median productivity state for the foreign economy around the
event is normal. This comes from the assumption that both shocks are perfectly
uncorrelated.
The dashed red line represents the laissez-faire equilibrium. From the upper-left
panel, the home economy accumulates debt gradually prior to the bad shock and
deleverage heavily for about 8% when the bad shock hits. The home economy starts
to increase borrowing again after the shock. In line with the bond deleverage at
the shock, the home consumption drops for about 4% from the upper-middle panel.
From the lower-left panel, the bond price shoots up at the shock due to the limited
asset supply from the home deleverage.
The foreign consumption rises slightly at the shock and drops close to 3% one year
after the shock, from the lower-middle panel. The slight rise of consumption results
from low asset supply after the home deleverage. Without enough assets to postpone
consumption, the foreign economy has to consume more. But why does foreign
consumption drop significantly one year later in the absence of a domestic shock?
First, it reflects the mechanical effect to restore bond positions to the previous level.
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Second, the low level of external assets tightens the foreign working capital constraint
and generates an output loss. In other words, the shortage of safe assets exacerbates
foreign financial frictions and amplifies the shock transmission.
The solid blue line is for the same low-home productivity event, but the foreign
saving tax is fixed at τ∗ = 0.087. Compared with the responses in the laissez-faire
economy, the home economy is less indebted during good times and deleverages less
at the shock. As a result, the consumption fall in the home economy is smaller, the
bond price is lower, and the consumption adjustment for the foreign economy is also
shallower. In one word, the GE effect is smaller.
To further understand the effect of the relative country size, Figure 1.8 plots the
foreign consumption volatility deviation from the laissez-faire equilibrium by a 1%
foreign saving tax, for different foreign/home GDP ratios.
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Figure 1.8: Effect of a foreign saving tax τ∗ = 0.01 on foreign consumption volatility
for different relative GDP
The figure confirms that a paradox of precaution appears when the foreign econ-
omy is relatively large. What’s more, the turning point is when the foreign economy
is about 63% of home GDP. This is approximately China’s relative GDP to the US
in 2017. Therefore, a paradox of precaution might appear by the late 2010s.
The late 2010s estimation can be radical. The Chinese financial system is im-
proving, and the US also enhances financial regulations. Mapping to the model, the
working capital coefficient for China θ∗ is decreasing, the pledgeability for China
φ∗ is increasing, and the US might have imposed a prudential tax themselves on
borrowing.
The late 2010s estimation can, however, also be conservative. First, the model
abstracts away other forceful channels of crisis contagion from the home economy
to the foreign economy, for example, through the collapse of trade, the flight of
capital, the interruption of financial services provided by the core countries, or the
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loss from an outright default. The GE effect should be stronger in reality than in
the model. Second, the GE effect can also be stronger with reproducible capital
that this model abstracts away. Reproducible capital propagates financial crises
in the home economy. This exacerbates the overall asset shortage problem from a
foreign perspective. The shortage of safe assets further forces the foreign economy
to increase in its portfolio the risky domestic capital.
The net bias is unclear. A safe conclusion is that we are increasingly likely
to see a paradox of precaution over time as the economies that save, which com-
prise many financially underdeveloped emerging markets, generally grow faster than
the economies that borrow, which comprise mainly financially developed advanced
economies.
1.4.2 Paradox of precaution - borrower version
I briefly discuss in this section the effect of a home borrowing tax. When the
foreign economy is large, the home borrowing tax reduces home volatility around
the laissez-faire equilibrium, consistent with the conventional wisdom. However,
when the foreign economy is small, the home borrowing tax increases home volatility
around the laissez-faire equilibrium. It also comes from the GE effect dominating
the direct effect. More borrowing increases the probability of a home crisis from
home shocks directly. But it also increases the asset supply to the foreign economy.
The foreign economy becomes safer from its shocks and is less likely to withdraw its
savings in large amounts. As a result, the home economy has a more stable source
of finance and becomes less vulnerable. This is a borrower’s version of the paradox
of precaution.
1.5 Normative analyses
The laissez-faire equilibrium is hardly optimal. There are inefficiencies both at the
domestic level and the international level. However, an individual surplus econo-
my such as China, Germany, or Japan only contributes to a fraction of the global
imbalances, so a national policymaker does not fully internalize the negative GE
effect.
I restrict the policy instrument to be a constant saving tax. It is feasible in
practice through capital control and/or reserve accumulation. To study the optimal
policies for the savers, I consider two extremes of the foreign policymaker’s problems.
First, the policymaker completely ignores the GE effect. For this purpose, I
extend the model to assume a continuum of identical atomistic foreign economies.
There is a policymaker in each of them. The policymaker in economy i chooses τ∗i
to maximize the unconditional expected welfare EV ∗i , taking the world bond price
Pt processes as given. The detailed policymaker’s problem ignoring the GE effect
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is described in Appendix 1.E, as well as the numerical algorithm for this complex
problem. In a symmetric equilibrium, τ∗i = τ
∗.
The setting resembles the policymaker’s problem in a small open economy with
one key difference: the GE effect exists but is ignored. The policymakers take the Pt
processes as given and choose τ∗i optimally. But the Pt processes are an equilibrium
outcome affected by τ∗.
From the policymaker i’s perspective, there is a domestic pecuniary externality
that matters because the consumer-entrepreneur takes the land price Q∗i,t and wage
W ∗i,t as given but these prices affect the tightness of the collateral constraint when
it is binding. In other words, the consumer-entrepreneur fails to internalize the fire-
sale externality when they borrow. The policymaker knows that a saving subsidy
induces more precautionary savings at good times. It mitigates the consumption
and land price fall in bad times. The higher land price, in turn, relaxes the financial
constraint and make the economy better off. The policymaker, therefore, wants to
subsidize savings, as in Bianchi and Mendoza (2011); Bianchi (2011); Bianchi and
Mendoza (2018).
Second, the policymaker completely internalizes the GE effect. For this purpose,
the original model in section 1.3.1 is used. This is the case when a single saver is
dominatingly large or the foreign policymakers cooperate. A foreign policymaker
who internalizes the GE effect chooses τ∗ to maximize the unconditional expect-
ed welfare EV ∗ of the competitive equilibrium. From the perspective of a foreign
policymaker that fully internalizes the GE effect, there are two additional ineffi-
ciencies internationally. Firstly, the foreign policymaker understands that a saving
tax reduces foreign savings. It reduces the home leverage and the home economy
deleverages less frequently and heavily. So, the home supply of safe assets and the
equilibrium bond price Pt are less volatile, which is good for the foreign economy.
The foreign policymaker, therefore, would like to tax savings to internalize this GE
effect I emphasized. Secondly, the foreign policymaker also knows that it can use its
monopoly power on the supply of savings. A saving tax reduces foreign savings and
raises the interest rate. The foreign policymaker, therefore, would like to tax savings
to extract the monopoly rents from the home economy. This extra GE effect that I
do not emphasize also drives the optimal choice toward a saving tax for nonstability
reasons. The net effect is ambiguous in theory.
Figure 1.9 adds two markers to the previous Figure 1.3. The square marker
shows the foreign policymaker’s choice if the GE effect is fully ignored. The triangle
marker shows the foreign policymaker’s choice if the GE effect is fully internalized.
The results are quite different for the two extremes of the policymakers problem.
First, a foreign policymaker subsidizes saving if the GE effect is ignored because
the choice is driven solely by domestic concerns. However, it leads to an even worse
than the laissez-faire equilibrium for the foreign economies from the ignored negative
GE effect. When foreign economies are collectively half the size of the home as shown
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Figure 1.9: Effect of a foreign saving tax on foreign consumption volatility
Left: foreign-small scenario, Z
∗
/Z = 0.125 so nY ∗/Y = 0.5. Right: foreign-large scenario,
Z
∗
/Z = 0.342 so nY ∗/Y = 0.8. Circle marker: laissez-faire equilibrium. Star marker: the tax for
volatility minimizing. Square marker: policymaker’s choice ignoring GE effect ignored. Triangle
marker: policymaker’s choice considering GE effect.
in the left panel, the standard deviation of log adjusted consumption std
(
log Cˆ∗
)
increases from 0.024 in laissez-faire to 0.028 with intervention by policymakers. The
expected external saving position B∗/Y ∗ increases from 0.4 in laissez-faire to 0.6.
This means the debt-to-GDP ratio for the home economy increases from 0.2 in
laissez-faire to 0.3, a 50% increase. Foreign welfare, not shown in the figure, is
actually lower. When the foreign economy is large, the pattern is similar but the
magnitude is more limited. This is because, facing a low interest rate the policymaker
does not want to subsidize saving too much.
The result has strong policy implications. Global imbalances are not necessarily
desirable outcomes. It can be a symptom of a lack of cooperation between poli-
cymakers in the surplus economies. The consequence is excessive volatility for the
savers themselves. While it is a Pareto improvement for the surplus economies to re-
duce savings collectively, no policymaker wants to do this individually. Cooperation
between the surplus economies is thus necessary.
Second, the foreign policymaker taxes saving if the GE effect is fully internalized.
The saving tax is larger than that minimizes the consumption volatility, reflecting
the extra GE effect from a higher interest rate. For the foreign-small scenario,
the policymaker would rather choose a saving tax to reap the monopoly rents at a
higher interest rate despite the economy being more volatile than the laissez-faire.
The result echoes the Lucas criticism on the small welfare costs of economic volatility
in this kind of model.
The reality likely lies closer to the first result that the GE effect is completely
ignored. In addition to the fact that the surplus economies are individually small but
collectively large, policymakers in reality may also ignore the GE effect emphasized
in this chapter, simply because they are unaware of it when they choose policies.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies two competing forces of additional savings on economic stability
in a two-country framework. The direct effect of a larger buffer tends to enhance
the saving economy’s consumption smoothing and reduce its consumption volatility.
The general equilibrium (GE) effect does the opposite to the saving economy by
increasing the probability and depth of financial crises in the borrowing economy.
The policy implications of the chapter are twofold7. First, it calls for global rebal-
ances when saving economies are so large that a paradox of precaution appears. The
quantitative model suggests that, for the stability of their economies, policymakers
in saving economies should switch from encouraging saving to discouraging saving
from the late 2010s, given their size. While the estimation is approximate given the
model and parameter uncertainty, it is safe to say that the paradox of precaution is
increasingly likely over time because the developing savers tend to grow faster than
the developed borrowers. Policymakers in the saving economies should switch from
the saving subsidy to a saving tax in the foreseeable future, if not now. Second, the
chapter calls for international cooperation between the policymakers in the surplus
economies. Without global cooperation, there are excessive global imbalances and
excessive volatility for the savers themselves.
7In practice, two extra policies are worth consideration for global rebalances beyond the model.
First, better global safety nets from a more powerful global lender of last resort and bilateral
currency swap arrangements reduce the need for precautionary savings. Second, liberalizing the
trade of service to also helps economies at the center of the international financial system to narrow
down their current account deficits.
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Appendices
1.A Lemma 1 and 3
To prove Lemma 1, eliminate B2 and P2 from equations (1.8), (1.14) and (1.15) for
the µ2 > 0 case and from equations (1.7), (1.14) and (1.15) for the µ2 = 0 case. In
the µ2 > 0 case,
β (d2 −B∗1)
1/φ− (1 + β) =
β (B∗1 +K∗d∗2)−K∗d3β (d2 −B∗1) / ((1/φ− (1 + β))B∗2)
1 + β
.
In equilibrium, B∗1 < d2 as B∗2 > 0 from the global imbalance assumption. If
B∗1 ↑⇒ B∗2 ↑, the left-hand-side is smaller but the right-hand-side is larger, which is
a contradiction. In the µ2 = 0 case, P2 is a constant β (d2 +K
∗d∗2) / (d3 +K∗d∗3).
From equation (1.14), B∗1 ↑⇒ B∗2 ↑.
To prove Lemma 3, solve the laissez-faire equilibrium with τ∗ = 0 assuming
the collateral constraint is not binding. From the goods market clearing condition
Ct + C
∗
t = dt + K
∗d∗t , ∀t = 1, 2, 3 and the bond Euler equations of both economies
for today
P1 = β
C1
C2
= β
C∗1
C∗2
and tomorrow
P2 = β
C2
C3
= β
C∗2
C∗3
,
the bond pricing equations are straightforward as follows.
P1P2 = β
2d1 +K
∗d∗1
d3 +K∗d∗3
(1.16)
P2 = β
d2 +K
∗d∗2
d3 +K∗d∗3
(1.17)
From the home bond Euler equations and the budget constraints (1.1), (1.2),
and (1.4)
B2 =
β2
1 + β + β2
(
d1
P1P2
+
d2
P2
+ d3
)
− d3 (1.18)
From the above three equations
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B2 =
d3
1 + β + β2
(
(1 +K∗d∗3/d3)
(1 +K∗d∗1/d1)
+
β (1 +K∗d∗3/d3)
(1 +K∗d∗2/d2)
− (1 + β)
)
From the home bond and tree Euler equations, the collateral constraint is not
binding if
−B2 < φd3. (1.19)
Subsitute with the expression of B2,
1
1 + β + β2
(
(1 + β)− (1 +K
∗d∗3/d3)
(1 +K∗d∗1/d1)
− β (1 +K
∗d∗3/d3)
(1 +K∗d∗2/d2)
)
< φ.
The left-hand side is increasing in K∗ when d∗3/d3 < min (d∗1/d2, d∗2/d2), which I
assume to generate the global imbalances in the first place.
1.B Size of the savers
The economic growth rate is generally faster in the financially underdeveloped e-
merging markets, which run overall current account surpluses, than the financially
developed advanced economies, which run overall current account deficits. As a
result, savers are likely to gain relative importance compared with borrowers over
time, as shown in Figure 1.10.
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Figure 1.10: Relative size of emerging markets to advanced economies
Data and definition of emerging markets and advanced economies from IMF World Economic
Outlook 2018. Shaded area: projections.
While a small open economy has previously been a useful framework to study
the emerging markets, it is less apparent recently. The home economy mainly refers
to the US, and, to some extent, the UK, which are at the center of the international
financial system with the comparative advantage to provide safe assets for the rest
of the world. The US international investment position is evidently deteriorating
over time as shown in Figure 1.11. The same is true for the UK. While a financial
crisis is not necessarily imminent, the risk of adjustment is increasing.
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Figure 1.11: Net international investment position for the US
Data from FRED
1.C Equation system
The normalization of land to unit discussed in the calibration section is already
implemented. The complementary slackness conditions are transformed with new
variables µˆt, µˆ
∗
t ∈ (−∞,∞) as discussed in the numerical algorithm section.
Vt =
(
Ct − χL
1+ω
t
1+ω
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ + EtβVt+1 (1.20)
Ct + PtBt = ZtL
γ
t +Bt−1 (1.21)
γZt = (1 + µtθ)χL
ω+1−γ
t (1.22)
Qt (1− φµt) = Etβ
Ct+1 − χL1+ωt+11+ω
Ct − χL
1+ω
t
1+ω
−σ (Qt+1 + αZt+1Lγt+1) (1.23)
Pt (1− µt) = Etβ
Ct+1 − χL1+ωt+11+ω
Ct − χL
1+ω
t
1+ω
−σ (1.24)
PtBt + φQt − θχLω+1t = max
(
0,−µˆ3) (1.25)
µt = max
(
0, µˆt
3
)
(1.26)
V ∗t =
(
C∗t − χ∗ (L
∗
t )
1+ω∗
1+ω∗
)1−σ∗
− 1
1− σ∗ + Etβ
∗V ∗t+1 (1.27)
C∗t + PtB
∗
t = Z
∗
t (L
∗
t )
γ∗ +B∗t−1 (1.28)
γ∗Z∗t = (1 + µ
∗
t θ
∗)χ∗ (L∗t )
ω∗+1−γ∗ (1.29)
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Q∗t (1− φ∗µ∗t ) = Etβ∗
C∗t+1 − χ∗ (L∗t+1)
1+ω∗
1+ω∗
C∗t − χ∗ (L
∗
t )
1+ω∗
1+ω∗

−σ∗ (
Q∗t+1 + α
∗Z∗t+1
(
L∗t+1
)γ∗)
(1.30)
Pt (1 + τ
∗ − µ∗t ) = Etβ∗
C∗t+1 − χ∗ (L∗t+1)
1+ω∗
1+ω∗
C∗t − χ∗ (L
∗
t )
1+ω∗
1+ω∗

−σ∗
(1.31)
PtB
∗
t + φ
∗Q∗t − θ∗χ∗ (L∗t )ω
∗+1 = max
(
0,− (µˆ∗)3
)
(1.32)
µ∗t = max
(
0, (µˆt
∗)3
)
(1.33)
Bt + nB
∗
t = 0 (1.34)
1.D Numerical algorithm
Time iteration algorithm
I use a time iteration algorithm as in Coleman (1990), which directly operates on
first-order conditions, modified to address occasionally binding constraints. To solve
the dynamic equation system Etf (Xt+1, st+1, Xt, st, Xt−1, τ∗) = 0 defined as equa-
tions 1.20 to 1.34 where Xt are the endogenous variables, st ∈ Zt×Z∗t are the shock
variables, do the following:
1, Generate a discrete grid for the economy’s state variable Xt−1 and current
shock variable st. I will use adaptive grids to be explained in more detail.
2, Make an initial guess of the time-invariant policy function Xt = X 0 (Xt−1, st).
The policy functions are approximated with the finite element method to take care
of the kinks arising from the occasionally binding constraints. Linear interpolation
is used.
3, Iteration m
(a) Solve Xmt such that Etf
(Xm−1 (Xmt , st+1) , st+1, Xmt , st, Xt−1, τ∗) = 0 for
each grid point.
(b) Update the guess of policy function Xm so that Xmt = Xm (Xt−1, st)
(c) Go to (a) if the update is larger than a threshold
∣∣∣∣Xm −Xm−1∣∣∣∣ >  and set
m = m+ 1.
Adaptive grids
The adaptive grids are implemented in the following way.
1, The model is solved using a coarse equidistant grid with few points.
2, The accuracy of the solution is then evaluated according to the Euler equation
errors at the middle of any two grid points.
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3, New grid points are placed at those inaccurate parts according to the following
the two rules.
(a) The number of new grid points is proportional to the Euler equation errors
between existing grid points.
(b) No new grid points will be placed on inaccurate parts that will not be visited
in the ergodic distribution of variables. The ergodic states are calculated directly
from the policy functions.
4, Steps 1-3 are repeated in several rounds.
More specifically, the initial grid points are 80× 3× 3 = 720, in which 80 are for
the continuous state Bt−1 and 3 for home productivity and 3 for foreign productivity.
I add two rounds of extra points 80 × 3 × 3 and 160 × 3 × 3 to those states that
are not accurate. The maximum Euler equation error is usually below 10−4 from
the solution. The adaptive grid method significantly accelerates the solution and
improves the precision for a given number of final grid points.
Simulation
The solutions are policy functions. To simulate, generate a series of productivity
shocks and choose an initial state. Evaluate the policy function to get new states
and other variables of interest. Repeat this to simulate forward. Discard the initial
20% of simulations with the potential transition from the choice of the initial state.
The simulations are then used to generate statistics for the ergodic distribution and
for event analysis.
Parallelization
The time iteration step 3(a) is the most costly because roots need to be found for a
non-linear equation system for a large number of states. The task is parallelized to
accelerate. The policy functions can be solved fairly quickly and accurately. To give
some sense, for one set of parameterizations the model can be solved in 10 minutes
with 8 CPU cores on the LSE Fabian high-performance computing platform.
1.E Foreign policymaker’s problem ignoring GE effect
For simplicity, assume foreign economies receive the same productivity shock Z∗t .
The welfare V ∗i for a given state solves the foreign representative consumer-entrepreneur’s
utility maximization problem, taking the foreign policymaker’s choice τ∗i as given.
V ∗i
(
B∗i,t−1, B
∗
t−1, Z
∗
t , Zt
)
= max
(
C∗i,t − χ(
Ls∗i,t)
1+ω∗
1+ω∗
)1−σ∗
− 1
1− σ∗ +EtV
∗
i
(
B∗i,t, B
∗
t , Z
∗
t+1, Zt+1
)
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s.t.
C∗i,t +Q
∗
i,t
(
K∗i,t −K∗i,t−1
)
+ Pt (1 + τ
∗
i )B
∗
i,t
= W ∗i,tL
s∗
i,t +B
∗
i,t−1 +
(
Z∗t
(
K∗i,t−1
)α∗ (
Ld∗i,t
)γ∗ −W ∗i,tLd∗i,t)+ T ∗i,t
−PtB∗i,t + θ∗W ∗i,tLd∗i,t ≤ φ∗Q∗i,tK∗i,t
The state variables for the foreign economy i’s problem are B∗i,t−1, B
∗
t−1, Z∗t , Zt.
The representative consumer-entrepreneur takes as given the rest of the foreign
economies’ bond policy function B
∗
t = B∗
(
B
∗
t−1, Z∗t , Zt
)
and the bond price from
the GE Pt = P
(
B
∗
t−1, Z∗t , Zt
)
. Her individual choices such as B∗i,t have no effect on
the international bond prices.
The saving tax is fully rebated τ∗i PtB
∗
i,t = T
∗
i,t through lump-sum transfers. The
domestic land market clears with normalization K∗i,t = 1 and domestic labor market
clears Ls∗i,t = L
d∗
i,t.
The policymaker maximizes the unconditional expected welfare EV ∗i of the rep-
resentative consumer-entrepreneur by choosing the saving tax τi.
General equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium B∗i,t = B
∗
t = B
∗
t and τ
∗
i = τ
∗. The policy func-
tions for economy i degenerates. For example, the bond policy function B∗i,t =
B∗i
(
B∗i,t−1, B
∗
t−1, Z∗t , Zt
)
degenerate to B∗ = B∗ (B∗t−1, Z∗t , Zt). Although the indi-
vidual consumer-entrepreneur’s problem in economy i takes both the individual and
aggregate states, the two states become identical in a symmetric equilibrium.
The rest of the foreign economies’ bond policy function B
∗
t = B∗
(
B
∗
t−1, Z∗t , Zt
)
and the bond price from the general equilibrium Pt = P
(
B
∗
t−1, Z∗t , Zt
)
solve the
general equilibrium of competitive equilibrium defined in section 1.3.1, given the
optimal choice of the saving tax τ∗ by symmetric foreign policymakers.
Numerical algorithm
The problem can be solved by repeating two steps. First, for given τ∗ solve the
problem in section 1.3.1 for the processes of Pt and Bt. Second, given Pt and Bt
processes, solve the policymaker’s problem in section 1.E for τi and set τ = τi.
Repeat the two steps until it converges. The algorithm within each step follows
section 1.D.
The second step involves an extra continuous state. To mitigate the curse of
dimension, I use a set of efficient grids for the aggregate state B
∗
t−1. More specifically,
one grid point is placed exactly at the state where the home constraint is marginally
binding, and the rest of the grid points are placed sparingly. By doing this, a few
grid points are sufficient to capture the aggregate policy function well.
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Chapter 2
Consumption-led Growth
Abstract: Investment is bounded by retained earnings for young firms relying on self-
financing. The firms are underinvesting from the perspective of a constrained social
planner who cannot inject funds to the self-financing firms directly, for two reasons.
First, households do not internalize that additional consumption and labor supply
increases the profits of the self-financing firms. Second, firms with credit access
do not internalize that their expansion fueled by credit intensifies competition in
the factor market, drives up factor prices, and squeezes the profits of self-financing
firms. The social planner optimally chooses “pro-consumption” policies such as
a consumption subsidy and a saving tax on the household. More consumption
paradoxically leads to more investment and output for the self-financing firms.
2.1 Introduction
What shall a government do to accelerate economic growth in a developing economy
with poor financial development? The “pro-business” policies, such as a wage sup-
pression to increase firm profit and a credit subsidy to encourage investment, seem to
be one answer (see e.g. Itskhoki and Moll (2019)). This chapter argues instead that
the optimal policies can be “pro-consumption”. A consumption subsidy increases
the firm profit as well, and a saving tax mitigates the capital misallocation between
the self-financing firms and the firms with credit access (see e.g. Song et al. (2014)).
Central to the theory are the firms that are young, small, investing in risky
projects, investing in innovative projects, and/or not guaranteed by the government.
Although being more productive, they tend to be very likely denied bank credit.
Equity finance is also quite limited from the poorly developed venture capital or
stock market in developing economies. As a result, they rely on self-financing and
cannot invest more than their retained earnings. When the constraint is binding,
they remain too small for too long.
The competitive equilibrium is inefficient from two market failures in the econo-
my. First, the households do not internalize that additional consumption and labor
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supply lead to higher output and profit level of the self-financing firms. To im-
prove, a social planner subsidizes household consumption to distort the household
consumption–leisure choice toward consumption. This drives up the consumption
demand and boosts firm profits1.
Second, firms with credit access do not internalize that their expansion fueled
by credit out-competes self-financing firms. They intensify the competition on the
factor market, such as labor, office space, energy, and intermediary goods. The pe-
cuniary externality from higher factor prices matters because it squeezes the profits
of the constrained self-financing firms. The competitive economy is dynamically
inefficient. To improve, a social planner taxes household saving to make borrowing
costlier by the external-financing firms. The external-financing firms shrink, release
resources to the self-financing firms, and they expand. While the resulting consump-
tion increase crowds out aggregate investment, it crowds in investment by the more
productive self-financing firms and mitigates capital misallocation.
In the model, the self-financing firms with exogenous entry and exit dynamics
make hiring, investment, and dividend decisions, for the interest of a representative
household. They rely on self-financing because they cannot borrow or finance with
equity in the form of paying a negative dividend. The finite horizon prevents the
firms from growing to the point that all desired investment can be financed with
retained earnings. The assumption of common objectives for the interest of the
household minimizes the heterogeneity to be tracked. The firms can be thought of
as being operated by the members of the household with full consumption-insurance
who pool their resources at the end of each period to consume. In short, the firms
are modeled as the banks in Gertler and Karadi (2011), except that they use their
own funds. The framework allows great tractability because the self-financing firms
are easily aggregated to a constrained representative firm.
I study the Ramsey problem analytically for a constrained social planner who
cannot inject funds directly to the self-financing firms. The social planner’s solution
can be decentralized with a consumption subsidy and a saving tax.
The model is then brought to numerical analysis by calibrating to China. The
pro-consumption policies can increase welfare by as much as increasing consumption
by 1% permanently while keeping labor supply unchanged from the steady state of
the competitive equilibrium. The long-run aggregate consumption is 5% higher, the
long-run investment is 13% lower, and the long-run aggregate output is 4% higher.
The optimal consumption subsidy reduces from about 16% in the short run to 14%
in the long run and the optimal saving tax rises from about 4% to 4.5%.
If only constant non-negative taxes are allowed, the optimal policy is a constant
saving tax at 3.67%. The consumption-equivalent of welfare gain is still positive at
0.34%, although the long-run aggregate output is 2% lower. But the 2% lower long-
1The consumption subsidy can be interpreted as a working subsidy. It drives up the labor supply
and boosts firm profits. The household ends up with more consumption.
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run output is achieved with 16% lower aggregate capital and slightly lower labor,
suggesting a large improvement of the total factor productivity.
This chapter contributes to the economic policy debate by showing that pro-
consumption policies paradoxically lead to an expansion of the self-financing firms,
and increase economic welfare as a whole. It also shows that the best combination of
the pro-consumption policies leads to aggregate output growth both in the short run
and in the long run, consistent with the at-first-glance puzzling idea of consumption-
led growth. Finally, it provides a very tractable framework for self-financing firms.
Three closely related papers are Song et al. (2014), Ventura and Voth (2015), and
Itskhoki and Moll (2019). The first studies the growth effect of exchange rate policy,
interest rate policy, and deposit rate policy. In particular, it shows that high interest
rate mitigates the disadvantage of financially constrained firms, reduces wages, and
increases the speed of transition from low- to high-productivity firms. Its analysis is
positive. This chapter highlights this channel as a second reason for pro-consumption
policies by building a tractable model for self-financing firms and further develops
it normatively by solving a constrained social planner’s problem. Ventura and Voth
(2015) provides a historical account that the expansion of British government bor-
rowing during the industrial revolution crowded out agricultural investments by the
nobility and freed resources for the growth of self-financing industries like textile.
Itskhoki and Moll (2019) advocates pro-business policies such as labor and saving
subsidy for a developmental government. The consumption subsidy in this chapter
shares the same insight with the labor subsidy in their paper. By contrast, the social
planner in this chapter optimally chooses a saving tax, rather than a saving subsidy
as in their paper, for the additional insight in Song et al. (2014) and Ventura and
Voth (2015). The optimal policies under one umbrella are instead pro-consumption.
This chapter complements the larger literature on capital misallocation and pro-
ductivity. A low interest rate can worsen capital misallocation through various
other channels as in Liu et al. (2017), Caggese and Perez-Orive (2017), Bleck and
Liu (2018). In the international context, the financial resource curse can also be
understood with various other channels of misallocation as in Reis (2013), Benigno
and Fornaro (2014), Gopinath et al. (2017).
This chapter differs crucially from the Keynesian framework that the output
is demand-dependent in the short-run. First, there is insufficient investment by
the financially constrained firms rather than insufficient demand. Second, the pro-
consumption policies have a long-run effect if the self-financing firms are constrained
at the steady state. In some Keynesian models with secular stagnation (see e.g.
Benigno and Fornaro (2017); Eggertsson et al. (2019)), demand policies can have
a long-run effect by driving the economy out of a permanent liquidity trap. The
inefficiency in this literature comes from the zero-lower bound of nominal interest
rate, which is absent in my real framework.
The concept of consumption-led growth in this chapter differs crucially from
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Brunnermeier et al. (2018). In their paper, it means a consumption boom financed
by a current account deficit stimulates the non-tradable sector and its innovation
productivity. In this chapter, it is about a developmental government actively choos-
ing pro-consumption policies, leading to higher output or higher welfare at least.
The rest of this chapter will be organized as follows: in Section Two, I introduce
the self-financing firms and study the optimal consumption subsidy; in Section Three
I extend the model to two sectors allowing firms with access to credit and study
optimal consumption subsidy and saving tax; in Section Four I conduct numerical
analysis. Section Five concludes.
2.2 Model
In this section, I introduce a one-sector model of self-financing firms. There are
three types of agents: a representative household, self-financing firms, and a govern-
ment. The household makes consumption, saving, and labor supply decisions. The
self-financing firms, owned by the household, make labor demand, investment, and
dividend decisions, for the interest of the household. The government collects taxes
on consumption and saving and transfers the revenue back to the household in a
lump sum.
2.2.1 Household’s problem
The representative household makes consumption Ct, saving Bt and labor supply
Lt decisions to maximize its sum of discounted utility subject to period budget
constraints as follows.
max
Ct,Bt,Lt
∞∑
t=1
βt
(
C1−γt
1− γ −
L1+χt
1 + χ
)
s.t. (
1 + τCt
)
Ct +
(
1 + τBt
)
PtBt = WtLt +Dt +Bt−1 + Tt
The household derives utility from consumption and disutility from labor supply.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1/γ, the inverse Frisch elasticity is χ,
and the discount factor is β. It earns wage Wt, receives dividends from firms Dt, gets
repayment from maturing one-period riskless bond Bt−1 and is rebated government
revenue Tt in a lump sum. The household uses the proceeds to consume and make
bond investment Bt at the market price Pt. The government imposes a proportional
consumption tax τ ct (subsidy if it is negative) and a saving tax τ
B
t (subsidy if it is
negative).
The marginal utility for an additional unit of consumption is βtC−γt and the
marginal disutility from an additional unit of labor supply is βtLχt . From each unit
of additional labor supply, the wage Wt can be used to purchase Wt/
(
1 + τCt
)
unit
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of consumption goods. The household chooses to supply labor until the additional
utility from consumption equals the marginal disutility of labor supply.
Wt/
(
1 + τC
)
C−γt = L
χ
t (2.1)
The effective after-tax bond price is
(
1 + τBt
)
Pt. The household purchases bonds
until the effective bond price equals its discount factor.
(
1 + τBt
)
Pt = β
Cγt
Cγt+1
(2.2)
2.2.2 Firms’ problem
There is a continuum of measure one firms with exogenous entry and exit dynamics.
Each firm decides how much labor to demand and produces goods with capital and
labor using the same constant return to scale production function. A firm exits with
an independent probability 1−σ every period after the production. If the firm exits,
it brings its profits back to the household as a final dividend payment. On average,
a firm operates 1/ (1− σ) periods. In total, 1− σ firms exit. The same measure of
new firms enter to replace each exiting firm, keeping the total firms fixed. The new
firms receive a start-up fund as a small proportion η < 1− σ of the total profits of
the firms from the household. Each of the remaining and new firms makes a decision
on how much capital to buy and how much discretionary dividend to pay, for the
interest of the household. In short, the firms are modeled as the banks in Gertler
and Karadi (2011) except that they finance themselves.
The firm i’s problem is the following.
max
lci,t,k
c
i,t,d
c
i,t
∞∑
t=1
βtC−γt σ
t−1 ((1− σ)pici,t + σdci,t)
s.t.
pici,t =
(
Ac
(
kci,t−1
)α (
lci,t
)1−α
+ (1− δ)kci,t−1 −Wtlci,t
)
kci,t + d
c
i,t = pi
c
i,t
dci,t ≥ 0
A firm has the probability σt−1 (1− σ) to exit just after the period t, and it
brings its profits pici,t to the household as a final dividend. It has the probability
σt−1σ to remain active after the period t and it chooses a discretionary dividend
payment dct to the household. Therefore, the expected total dividend at time t is
σt−1
(
(1− σ)pici,t + σdci,t
)
. It discounts its expected future dividend by the house-
hold’s marginal utility of consumption βtC−γt .
At the beginning of the period, the firm decides how much labor to demand
lci,t, given its capital stock k
c
i,t−1. It produces using a Cobb-Douglas production
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function with common productivity Ac, capital share α and labor share 1−α. It
pays market wage Wt. Capital depreciates with rate δ. Therefore, the firm’s profit
is pici,t =
(
Ac
(
kci,t−1
)α (
lci,t
)1−α
+ (1− δ)kci,t−1 −Wtlci
)
. If the firm remains active
after the production (or it is a new firm), it determines the investment kci,t and the
discretionary dividend dci,t out of the profit pi
c
i,t (or its start-up fund). The firm
cannot pay any negative dividend di,t ≥ 0. Without equity finance or debt finance,
the firm has to rely on self-financing.
Denote ξci,t, ν
c
i,t, ν
c
i,tµ
c
i,t the shadow prices to relax the profit constraint, the budget
constraint and the no equity finance constraint, the first-order conditions (FOCs)
are the following.
FOC lci,t : W
c
t = (1− α)Ac
(
kci,t−1
)α (
lci,t
)−α
The firm demands labor until its marginal product of labor equals the wage.
FOC pici,t : β
tC−γt σ
t−1 (1− σ)− ξci,t + νci,t = 0
The firm wants to increase its profit as each unit increases the household utility
by βtC−γt σt−1 (1− σ), but it tightens the profit-constraint at the shadow price ξci,t
and relaxes the budget constraint at the shadow price νci,t. For optimality, the net
marginal return is zero.
FOC kci,t : − νci,t + ξci,t+1
(
αAc
(
kci,t
)α−1 (
lci,t+1
)1−α
+ (1− δ)
)
= 0
An additional unit of capital investment tightens the budget constraint at the shadow
price νci,t but relaxes the profit constraint in the next period by αA
c
(
kci,t
)α−1 (
lci,t+1
)1−α
+
(1− δ) at the shadow price ξci,t+1. For optimality, the net marginal return is zero.
FOC dci,t : β
tC−γt σ
t−1σ = (1− µci,t)νci,t
An additional unit of discretionary dividend increases the household utility by
βtC−γt σt−1σ. It tightens the budget constraint at the shadow price νci,t but re-
laxes the no equity finance constraint at the shadow price νci,tµ
c
i,t. For optimality,
the net marginal return is zero. The associated complementary slackness condition
is the following.
dci,t ≥ 0, µci,t ≥ 0, dci,tµci,t = 0
Eliminate the shadow prices ξci,t, ν
c
i,t, the capital Euler equation for the firm is
1 =
(
αAc
(
kci,t
)α−1 (
lci,t+1
)1−α
+ (1− δ)
)
β
Cγt
Cγt+1
(
(1− σ) (1− µci,t)+ σ 1− µci,t1− µci,t+1
)
.
The price of capital, which is unit, equals the marginal return of capital multiplying
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the discount factor used by the firm. The discount factor used by the firm differs
from the household, with an additional term coming from the random exit. The
additional term equals to 1 if the firm is unconstrained in investment µci,t = 0.
In this case the firm’s discount factor is identical to the household. If the firm is
constrained in investment µci,t > 0, the firm’s discount factor is usually smaller than
the household. The “impatient” firm requires a higher return of capital, and as a
result, invests less amount of capital than that an unconstrained firm would like to
choose.
From the FOC of labor, the firms choose the same labor-capital ratio. Combine
with the Euler equation, their shadow value of relaxing the non-negative dividend
constraints (normalized by the shadow price of relaxing the budget constraint) must
also be identical.
µci,t = µt
As a result, they make the same discretionary dividend and investment decision-
s proportional to their profits. Denote the total dividend Dt, total discretionary
dividend Dct , total capital Kt, and total labor Lt. The firms’ optimal choices can
be easily aggregated. The optimal labor demand, optimal capital investment, bud-
get constraint, dividend payment, and complementary slackness conditions are the
following, respectively.
Wt = (1− α)Ac
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
−α . (2.3)
1 =
(
αAc (Kct )
α−1 (Lct+1)1−α + (1− δ))β CγtCγt+1
(
(1− σ) (1− µt) + σ 1− µt
1− µt+1
)
(2.4)
Kct +D
c
t = (σ + η)
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
(2.5)
Dt = (1− σ − η)
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
+Dct (2.6)
Dct ≥ 0, µt ≥ 0, Dctµt = 0 (2.7)
The continuing firms have in total σ
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
prof-
its and the new firms bring in another η
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
start-
up funds. The firms use the proceeds to make total investment Kct and total dis-
cretionary dividend Dct . The total dividend from the firms equals the profits from
the exiting firms, subtracting the start-up fund, and adding the total discretionary
dividend.
If the non-negative dividend constraint is not binding µt = 0, the investment K
c
t
is determined by equation (2.4). If the constraint is binding µct > 0, the discretionary
dividend Dct = 0 and the investment K
c
t evolves as in equation (2.5). The self-
financing firms’ aggregate solution is identical to the solution to the problem of
a representative self-financing firm facing an additional investment constraint as
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follows.
max
Lct ,K
c
t ,Dt
∞∑
t=1
βtC−γt Dt
s.t.
Kct +Dt = αA
c
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
Kct ≤ (σ + η)
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
Intuitively, the exit of firms is like paying a compulsory dividend of a fraction 1−σ
of the profits, which squeezes the retained-earnings the firms have for investment. If
the firm horizon is short (σ small) and the start-up fund is small (η small), the firms
will not be able to grow to the point that all desired investment can be financed
with profits.
In reality, firms that are young, small, investing in risky projects, investing in
innovative projects, and/or not guaranteed by the government are likely to rely on
self-financing. They are also more likely to exit business over time.
2.2.3 Competitive equilibrium
The bond market clears, the labor market clears, and the government runs a balanced
budget so that the taxes are fully rebated in lump-sum transfers.
Bt = 0 (2.8)
Lt = L
c
t (2.9)
τCt Ct + τ
B
t PtBt = Tt (2.10)
For given taxes
{
τCt , τ
B
t
}∞
t=1
and initial aggregate capital stock Kc0, a competitive
equilibrium is characterized by the labor supply equation (2.1), the labor demand
equation (2.3), the labor market clearing condition (3.7), the capital Euler equation
(2.4), the firms budget constraint (2.5), the complementary slackness condition (2.7),
and the resource constraint
Ct +K
c
t = A
c
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1.
The transfers Tt, the bond position Bt, the dividend Dt and the bond price Pt
can then be derived from equation (2.10), (2.8), (2.6), and (2.2), respectively. The
household budget constraint is satisfied by Walras law.
2.2.4 Optimal taxes
A constrained social planner cannot inject funds directly to the self-financing firms.
It maximizes the household objective, subject to the resource constraint and the
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aggregate investment constraint as follows.
max
Ct,Lct ,K
c
t
∞∑
t=1
βt
(
C1−γt
1− γ −
(Lct)
1+χ
1 + χ
)
s.t.
Ct +K
c
t = A
c
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
Kct ≤ (σ + η)
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
Denote the shadow prices for the two constraints λt and λtωt, respectively. De-
fine wage Wt as in the labor demand equation (2.3) in the competitive equilibrium
and rct the marginal return of capital r
c
t = αA
c
(
Kct−1
)α−1
(Lct)
1−α. The FOCs for
consumption, labor, and capital are the following.
0 =
∂Lt
∂Ct
= C−γt − λt
The shadow price of relaxing the resource constraint equals the marginal utility of
consumption.
∂Lt
∂Lt
= − (Lct)χ + λtWt + (σ + η)αωtλtWt = 0
The marginal disutility from working equals the wage multiplying the marginal
utility of consumption plus an additional benefit to be specified. For each unit of
additional labor supply, the social planner understands that the output increases by
Wt, which is the marginal productivity of labor. The firms earn additional profits
αWt. For the firms they have (σ + η)αWt additional retained earnings to invest.
As the marginal return from investment is ωtλt, we have the additional return in
utility terms (σ + η)αωtλtWt.
0 =
∂Lt
∂Kct
= −λt + λt+1
(
rct+1 + (1− δ)
)− λtωt + (σ + η) (αrct+1 + (1− δ))ωt+1λt+1
An additional unit of capital investment tightens the resource constraint at the
shadow price λt, but it relaxes the next period resource constraint by r
c
t+1+(1− δ) at
the shadow price λt+1. Moreover, the additional unit of capital investment tightens
the investment constraint at the shadow price λtωt, but it relaxes the next period
investment constraint by (σ + η)
(
αrct+1 + (1− δ)
)
at the shadow price ωt+1λt+1.
The associated complementary slackness condition is the following.(
(σ + η)
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−α + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
−Kct
)
ωt = 0, ωt ≥ 0.
The social planner’s choice of labor supply is therefore,
Wt (1 + α (σ + η)ωt)C
−γ
t = (L
c
t)
χ . (2.11)
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Comparing with the labor supply equation in the competitive equilibrium (2.1),
the constrained social planner chooses to work more and consume more because
it internalizes that the additional consumption and labor supply increase the self-
financing firms’ profits, allowing them to make more investment. The social cost
from consumption is 1/ (Wt (1 + α (σ + η)ωt)) unit of labor. It is less than 1/Wt
unit of labor2.
The constrained social planner’s solution can be decentralized with the consump-
tion tax. The optimal consumption tax solves
1
1 + τCt
= 1 + α (σ + η)ωt.
As a result, τCt < 0 if ωt > 0. The constrained planner indeed imposes a
consumption subsidy if the investment constraint is binding. The subsidy (-τCt ) is
higher if the shadow price of relaxing the investment constraint (normalized by the
marginal utility of consumption) is higher.
The consumption subsidy drives up the consumption demand. It induces the
firms to hire more workers, boosts profits of the self-financing firms and allows them
to make more investment3.
The consumption subsidy not only increases output in the current period with
additional labor, but also increases output in the next period with additional invest-
ment. More consumption paradoxically leads to more output in this period and the
next period for the self-financing firms.
If the self-financing firms have a low exit rate (1 − σ small), or in other words,
the investment constraint is slack (σ large), the investment constraint will not be
binding at the steady state. But it is binding during the early stage of transition
when the aggregate capital stock is so low that the desired investment is relatively
large. The constrained social planner then imposes the consumption subsidy during
the early stage of transition, which decreases to zero over time. This accelerates
the transition to the steady state. The growth rate is higher. In this sense, this
pro-consumption policy generates consumption-led growth during the transition.
If the self-financing firms instead have a high exit rate (1− σ large), or in other
words, the investment constraint is tight (σ small), the investment constraint will
be binding at the steady state. The constrained social planner then imposes the
consumption subsidy even at the steady state. Such a consumption subsidy not
only accelerates the transition to the steady state but also increases the steady-state
output itself. In this sense, this pro-consumption policy generates consumption-led
growth both during the transition and to the higher steady state.
2Put it in another way, the social return from working is larger than W unit of consumption.
3Put it in another way, the consumption subsidy drives up the labor supply and boosts firm
profits. The consumption subsidy has the same effect as a working subsidy.
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2.3 Two-sector extension
In this section, I introduce a two-sector extension. In addition to a continuum of
measure one of self-financing firms in one sector, there is also a continuum of measure
one firms with full credit access in another sector. The setting of a firm’s problem
is identical to the specification in section 2.2.2 except for two modifications. First,
each firm operates the same decreasing return to scale production function. Second,
the self-financing firms can trade bonds with each other within their sector while
the firms with credit access can also trade bonds with the household.
All intuition goes through during the transition without making the two modi-
fications, but one sector will disappear at the steady-state. The decreasing return
to scale captures the scarcity of managerial or organization capital in reality, and it
is convenient for modeling two sectors without the complication of two goods. The
inter-firm bond market within the sector allows for easy aggregation.
2.3.1 Competitive equilibrium
In the self-financing sector, the firm i’s problem is the following.
max
lci,t,k
c
i,t,d
c
i,t,b
c
i,t
∞∑
t=1
βtC−γt σ
t−1 ((1− σ)pici,t + σdci,t)
s.t.
pici,t =
(
Ac
(
kci,t−1
)α (
lci,t
)1−θ
+ (1− δ)kci,t−1 −W ct lci,t
)
+ bci,t−1
kci,t + d
c
i,t + P
c
t b
c
i,t = pi
c
i,t
dci,t ≥ 0
The firm’s production function is decreasing return to scale α < θ. The firm can
buy bci,t bond at the market price P
c
t in an inter-firm market within the self-financing
sector. This market clears when the net bond position is zero.∫ 1
0
bci,t = 0
With the two modifications, each firm hires the same amount of labor and invests
the same amount of capital in the sector. The law of motion of the aggregate
variables for the self-financing firms looks like section 2.2.2 with minimum changes
(details in Appendix 2.A) as follows. And they are identical if θ = α.
Wt = (1− θ)Ac
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
−θ (2.12)
1 =
(
rct+1 + (1− δ)
)
β
Cγt
Cγt+1
(
(1− σ) (1− µt) + σ 1− µt
1− µt+1
)
(2.13)
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rct = αA
c
(
Kct−1
)α−1
(Lct)
1−θ (2.14)
Kct +D
c
t = (σ + η)
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
(2.15)
Dt = (1− σ − η)
(
θAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
+Dct (2.16)
Dct ≥ 0, µt ≥ 0, Dctµt = 0 (2.17)
The equations are the optimal labor demand, optimal capital investment, capital
return, budget constraint, dividend payment, and complementary slackness condi-
tions, respectively.
In the unconstrained sector with full access to the credit market, the firm i’s
problem is the following.
max
lui,t,k
u
i,t,d
u
i,t,b
u
i,t
∞∑
t=1
βtC−γt σ
t−1 ((1− σ)piui,t + σdui,t)
s.t.
piui,t = A
u
(
kui,t−1
)α (
lui,t
)1−θ
+ (1− δ)kui,t−1 −W ut lui,t + bui,t−1
kui,t + d
u
i,t + Ptb
u
i,t = pi
u
i,t
dui,t ≥ 0
The firm can trade bond bui,t at the market price Pt with the other firms in this
sector and with the household. The bond market clears when the net bond position
between this sector and the household is zero.∫ 1
0
bui,t +Bt = 0
Denote capitalized variables the aggregate variable in this sector, the optimality
conditions can be derived likewise. The labor demand equation takes the same
form.
Wt = (1− θ)Au
(
Kut−1
)α
(Lut )
−θ (2.18)
The abitrage between the bond investment and capital investment equalizes the
return.
1/Pt = r
u
t+1 + (1− δ)
where the capital return for the unconstrained sector ru is defined similarly as
rut = αA
u
(
Kut−1
)α−1
(Lut )
1−θ . (2.19)
Combine with the household bond Euler equation (2.2), the investment of the un-
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constrained firms will be affected by the saving tax4.
1 + τBt =
(
rut+1 + (1− δ)
)
β
Cγt
Cγt+1
(2.20)
The labor market clearing condition closes the model. The labor demand by the
two sectors of firms equals the labor supply by the household.
Lct + L
u
t = Lt
From the two labor demand equations (2.12) and (2.18) from the two sectors,
labor is allocated proportionally to the capital stock adjusted by productivities be-
tween the two sectors.
Lct =
(Ac)1/θ
(
Kct−1
)α/θ
(Ac)1/θ
(
Kct−1
)α/θ
+ (Au)1/α
(
Kut−1
)α/θLt (2.21)
Lut =
(Au)1/α
(
Kut−1
)α/θ
(Ac)1/θ
(
Kct−1
)α/θ
+ (Au)1/θ
(
Kut−1
)α/θLt (2.22)
2.3.2 Optimal taxes
A constrained social planner cannot inject funds directly to the self-financing firms.
It maximizes the household objective subject to the resource constraint and the
aggregate investment constraint for the self-financing sector as following.
max
Ct,Lt,Kut ,K
c
t
∞∑
t=1
βt
(
C1−γt
1− γ −
L1+χt
1 + χ
)
s.t.
Ct+K
u
t +K
c
t = A
u
(
Kut−1
)
α (Lut )
1−θ+(1− δ)Kut−1+Ac
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ+(1− δ)Kct−1
Kct ≤ (σ + η)
(
θAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
where Lc and Lu are defined as in equation (2.21) and (2.22). The constrained social
planner cannot allocate labor arbitrarily between the two types of firms but follows
the market equilibrium.
Denote the shadow prices for the two constraints λt, ωtλt. Define wage Wt and
return of capital in the unconstrained sector rut as equations (2.1) and (2.19) in
the competitive equilibrium. The FOCs (details in Appendix 2.A) for consumption,
4A negative saving tax (saving subsidy) cannot be an equilibrium as the firm will borrow to pay
dividend.
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labor, and capital are the following.
0 =
∂Lt
∂Ct
= C−γt − λt
The shadow price of relaxing the resource constraint equals the marginal utility of
consumption.
0 =
∂Lt
∂Lt
= −Lχt + λtWt + (σ + η) θLct/LtωtλtWt (2.23)
The marginal disutility from working equals the wage multiplying the marginal u-
tility of consumption plus an additional benefit to be specified. For each unit of
additional labor supply, the social planner understands that the employment of
the self-financing firms increases proportionally by Lct/Lt. This increases output
in this sector by Lct/LtWt. Those firms earn additional profits θL
c
t/LtWt. There-
fore, they have (σ + η) θLct/LtWt additional retained earnings to invest. As the
marginal return from investment is ωtλt, we have the additional return in utility
terms (σ + η) θLct/LtωtλtWt.
0 =
∂Lt
∂Kut
= −λt +
(
rut+1 + 1− δ
)
λt+1 (2.24)
− (σ + η)Lct+1/Lt+1 (1− θ) rut+1ωt+1λt+1
The marginal disutility from reducing one unit of consumption for investment at this
period is −λt and this leads to an additional rut+1 +1−δ unit of return valued at the
price λt+1, subtracting an additional cost to be specified. For an additional unit of
capital in the unconstrained sector, it reduces total labor available for the existing
firms by (1− θ) rut+1/ (θWt) unit. Multiply this with the return from one unit addi-
tional labor (σ + η) θLct/LtωtλtWt as analyzed from the optimal labor supply condi-
tion, we get the additional disutility term − (σ + η)Lct+1/Lt+1 (1− θ) rut+1ωt+1λt+1.
The competitive equilibrium is dynamic inefficient as the social return of investment
is smaller (from the additional cost (σ + η)Lct+1/Lt+1 (1− θ) rut+1ωt+1λt+1) than the
private return in the unconstrained sector.
The associated complementary slackness condition is the following.(
(σ + η)
(
θAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
−Kct
)
ωt = 0, ωt ≥ 0
The social planner’s labor supply is the following.
Wt (1 + (σ + η) θL
c
t/Ltωt)C
−γ
t = L
χ
t
It chooses to supply more labor and consume more than the competitive equilibrium
(2.12) with the same reason as in section 2.2.4.
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The social planner’s investment decision is the following.
1 =
(
rut+1 + 1− δ
)
β
Cγt
Cγt+1
(
1− (σ + η)L
c
t+1/Lt+1 (1− θ) rut+1ωt+1
rut+1 + 1− δ
)
It chooses to invest less in the unconstrained sector as it demands a higher return
rut+1 than the competitive equilibrium (2.20). It internalizes the expansion in the
unconstrained sector out-competes the self-financing firms in the factor market and
squeezes their profits.
The constrained social planner’s solution can be implemented by choosing τCt
and τBt as follows.
1
1 + τCt
= 1 + θ (σ + η)Lct/Ltωt
1
1 + τBt
= 1− (σ + η)L
c
t+1/Lt+1 (1− θ) rut+1ωt+1
rut+1 + 1− δ
In addition to a saving subsidy τCt < 0, it imposes an additional saving tax
τBt > 0 if the investment constraint for the self-financing firms is binding ωt > 0.
The saving tax is higher if the shadow price of relaxing the investment constraint
(normalized by the marginal utility of consumption) is higher.
The saving tax drives up the required return of investment in the unconstrained
sector by 1/
(
1 + τBt
)
. It induces the unconstrained sector to invest less and releases
labor to the self-financing firms at the next period. This boosts the next-period
profits of the self-financing firms and allows them to make more investment then.
While the resulting consumption increase from the saving tax crowds out investment
in the unconstrained sector, it crowds in investment of the constrained firms in the
next period.
If the self-financing firms have a high exit rate (1−σ large), or in other words, the
investment constraint is tight (σ small), the investment constraint is binding at the
steady-state. The constrained social planner imposes both the consumption subsidy
and the saving tax at the steady-state. The unconstrained sector shrinks and the
consrained sector expands. The net effect on aggregate consumption and output in
the long run is ambiguous. But the pro-consumption policies lead to unambiguously
higher welfare by internalizing the two externalities.
The pro-consumption policies work differently to a generic demand policy in
the Keynesian framework as it aims to increase the profits of the constrained self-
financing firms. In particular, lowering the interest rate the firms facing is counter-
productive here because it exacerbates the misallocation on the supply side. The
policymaker instead inserts a wedge between the saving and borrowing rates.
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2.4 Numerical Analysis
To quantitatively evaluate the net effect of the pro-consumption policies, I calibrate
the two-sector extension of the model to China. Moreover, I also study optimal
simple taxes, which rule out any subsidy or time-varying tax. The social planner
starts to intervene from the steady-state of the competitive equilibrium without any
tax.
2.4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to China annually. The self-financing sector can be inter-
preted as the private sector and the sector with credit access can be interpreted as
the state-owned sector. Normalizing the productivity for the self-financing sector
Ac = 1, there are 9 parameters to calibrate. Table 3.1 summarizes the calibration.
Table 2.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
α 1/3 Capital share
δ 0.1 Depreciation rate
γ 2 1/γ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
χ 1 Inverse Frisch elasticity
β 0.96 Discount factor
θ 0.5 1− θ labor share, China is 50%.
σ 2/3 1/ (1− σ) average private-sector firm life, China is 3
η 0.0152 Start-up fund ratio, tar. Lc/L = 80% and Ic/I = 60%
Au 0.5724 Uncon. firm productivity, tar. Lc/L = 80% and Ic/I = 60%
I begin with the 6 conventional parameters. The capital share α is set to 1/3.
The depreciation rate δ is set to 0.1. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution
1/γ is set to 0.5. The inverse Frisch elasticity of labor χ is set to 1. The discount
factor β is set to 0.96. The Chinese labor share is around 50% so 1− θ is set to 0.5.
Three parameters (σ, η,Au) are specific to the model. The choice is meant to
be suggestive. The average life of the private-sector firms in China is 3 years, so
1/ (1− σ) is set to 3. The short life span of the private-sector firms provides one
rationale for why it is so difficult for them to obtain bank credit. The state-owned
firms can have a significantly longer expected life. But a different calibration for
them is unnecessary as they are not financially constrained.
The start-up fund to profit ratio η and the productivity of the unconstrained
firms Au are deep parameters. To pin down the two, I target the Chinese private-
sector employment share Lc/L and investment share Ic/I at the steady-state of the
competitive equilibrium5. The recent private-sector employment share is 80%, and
the private-sector investment share is 60% in China. I use these two values. As a
5The net investment I = δK and Ic = δKc at the steady state
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result, Au = 0.5724 and η = 0.0152. The state-owned firms are much less efficient
than the private sector, and the private sector receives little start-up fund.
2.4.2 Optimal taxes
The model is solved globally using the relaxation algorithm. Figure 2.1 shows the
constrained social planner’s solution in blue solid lines and the competitive equilib-
rium in red dashed lines. The red dash lines are horizontal because the economy
starts from the steady state of the competitive equilibrium. The self-financing firm-
s’ employment as a fraction of total is about 80%, and capital investment in total
investment is about 60%. These are exactly the targets for the calibration.
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Figure 2.1: Social planner vs. competitive equilibrium
The social planner expands the self-financing sector at the cost of the uncon-
strained sector. Both labor and capital reallocate to the self-financing sector over
20 years. The aggregate consumption and output are higher. The labor demands
from the two sectors adjust slowly towards the new steady state because the capital
stocks in the two sectors evolve slowly. The labor demand in the short run in the
unconstrained sector is even higher than the competitive equilibrium. This is possi-
ble because the social planner increases the aggregate employment a lot in response
to the boom from higher consumption demand.
For ease of comparison, Figure 2.2 shows the deviation of the social planner’s
choice from the competitive equilibrium for the four aggregate variables: the labor,
capital, consumption, and output. The social planner chooses a higher employment.
The employment increases overtime to reach about 7% more in the long run. The
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Figure 2.2: The social planner’s choice, in percentage deviation
(roughly) upward trend mainly reflects the reduction of capital mis-allocation and
the increase in total factor productivity. The capital stock drops immediately in the
short run, and it further drops to 13% lower in the long run. The social planner
prefers a lower capital stock, suggesting that the economy as a whole is dynamic
inefficient. The consumption jumps to nearly 10% higher in the short run, benefiting
from the reduction in the investment and the additional labor supply. It is more
than 5% higher in the long run. Output increases by 2% in the short run and
eventually grows to nearly 4% higher. The results are consistent with the idea of
consumption-led growth.
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Figure 2.3: Tax and welfare
The social planner’s solution can be implemented with a time-varying consump-
tion subsidy and a time-varying saving tax, as shown in Figure 2.3. The optimal
consumption subsidy reduces from about 16% in the short run to 14% in the long
run and the optimal saving tax rises from about 4% to 4.5%. The right panel
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shows the welfare effect in terms of equivalent consumption change to the com-
petitive equilibrium, keeping the labor supply unchanged. The pro-consumption
policies increase economic welfare by that equals about 1% more consumption for-
ever than the competitive equilibrium. The red dashed line shows the welfare gain
in consumption-equivalent for each period. The household benefits a lot in the short
run, it loses a little in the medium-run and benefits about 0.5% higher welfare in
consumption-equivalent per year in the long run.
2.4.3 Optimal constant non-negative taxes
0 0.02 0.04
B
0.08%
0.22%
0.35%
consumption equivalent
Figure 2.4: Welfare effect of the constant saving tax
The time-varying subsidy and tax can be difficult to implement in practice. In
particular, there is no non-distortionary lump-sum tax to finance a large subsidy6.
I study in this section the optimal constant non-negative taxes the social planner
would like to choose, still from the steady state of the competitive equilibrium.
The social planner will not choose any consumption tax but will choose a constant
saving tax at 3.67%. Therefore, the long-run interest rate for the unconstrained firms
doubles from 4% to 8%. This leads to a consumption-equivalent of welfare gain at
0.34%, about 1/3 of that in the last section. Figure 2.4 shows how the welfare gain
in consumption-equivalent changes with different constant saving tax. The curve is
upward-sloping when the tax is small as it improves capital allocation. The curve
becomes downward-sloping when the tax is large as it distorts the unconstrained
sector investment so much that the benefit from crowding in investment in the self-
financing sector is dominated.
Figure 2.5 shows the social planner’s solution with the 3.67% constant saving tax
in blue solid lines against the competitive equilibrium in red dashed lines. While
the pattern of sectoral reallocation is still there, as in the social planner’s solution
with the time-varying consumption subsidy and saving tax, consumption is higher
6The revenue from the saving tax is insufficient to cover the consumption subsidy.
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Figure 2.5: Social planner vs. competitive equilibrium (constant saving tax)
in the short run but lower in the long run. Moreover, the aggregate output is lower
throughout the transition. This is because, without the consumption subsidy, the
total employment is lower.
For ease of comparison, Figure 2.6 shows the deviation of the social planner’s
choice from the competitive equilibrium for the four aggregate variables. While
the pattern of the variables is still there as in the social planner’s solution with
the time-varying consumption subsidy and saving tax, the long-run implications are
quite different. The employment and consumption are both slightly smaller in the
long run. The output is about 2% lower. But the 2% lower long-run output is
achieved with 16% lower aggregate capital and slightly lower labor, suggesting a
large improvement of the total factor productivity.
The restricted pro-consumption policy, namely a constant saving tax at 3.67%,
leads to lower aggregate output both in the short run and long run. Consumption
does not lead to growth in output, though it leads to growth in productivity and
welfare.
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Figure 2.6: The social planner’s choice (constant saving tax), in percentage deviation
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter highlights two market failures in the presence of self-financing firms
that justify the consumption subsidy and saving tax. The pro-consumption policies
tend to increase consumption as well as output. Restricting the policies to include
constant non-negative tax only, the social planner will choose a constant saving tax.
The pro-consumption policy leads just to growth in welfare, not in output anymore.
For future work, another closely related channel that the unconstrained sector
fails to internalize is worth exploring. If the two sectors produce different but highly
substitutable goods, the expansion of the unconstrained firms steals market share
from the self-financing firms and squeezes their profits. Moreover, the insights and
the modeling framework in this chapter are also easy to generate to an open economy.
It provides a rationale for capital inflow control.
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Appendices
2.A Solution details
Modified self-financing firm’s problem in section 2.3
Denote ξci,t, ν
c
i,t, ν
c
i,tµ
c
i,t the shadow prices for the three constraints, respectively, the
optimality conditions are the following.
FOC lci,t : W
c
t = (1− θ)Ac
(
kci,t−1
)α (
lci,t
)−θ
FOC pici,t : β
tC−γt σ
t−1 (1− σ)− ξci,t + νci,t = 0
FOC kci,t : − νci,t + ξci,t+1
(
αAc
(
kci,t
)α−1 (
lci,t+1
)1−θ
+ (1− δ)
)
= 0
FOC dci,t : β
tC−γt σ
t−1σ = (1− µci,t)νci,t
FOC bci,t : − νci,tP ct + ξci,t+1 = 0
Complementarity slackness condition dci,t ≥ 0, µci,t ≥ 0, dci,tµci,t = 0
There is an additional FOC with regard to bi,t, in addition to k
c
i,t. From no-
arbitrage, the return from capital and bond must equal each other.
αAc
(
kci,t
)α−1 (
lci,t+1
)1−θ
+ (1− δ) = 1/Pt
From this no-arbitrage condition and the FOC with regard to lci,t,
kci,t =
(
1
Ac
(
Wt
1− θ
)1−θ (1/Pt − (1− δ)
α
)θ)1/(α−θ)
lci,t =
(
1
Ac
(
Wt
1− θ
)1−α(1/Pt − (1− δ)
α
)α)1/(α−θ)
Therefore, each firm hires the same amount of workers and invests the same amount
of capital.
kci,t = k
c
t
lci,t = l
c
t
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Eliminate ξci,t, ν
c
i,t. The Euler equation for the firm is
1 =
(
αAc
(
kci,t
)α−1 (
lci,t+1
)1−θ
+ (1− δ)
)
β
Cγt
Cγt+1
(
(1− σ) (1− µci,t)+ σ 1− µci,t1− µci,t+1
)
Their shadow value of relaxing the non-negative dividend constraints must be iden-
tical.
µci,t = µt
As a result, they make the same discretionary dividend and investment decisions
proportional regardless of their profits. Denote the total dividend Dt,total discre-
tionary dividend Dct , total capital Kt and total labor Lt. Clearing the inter-firm
bond market, the aggregate variables evolve in the following way.
Wt = (1− θ)Ac
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
−θ
1 =
(
αAc (Kct )
α−1 (Lct+1)1−θ + (1− δ))β CγtCγt+1
(
(1− σ) (1− µt) + σ 1− µt
1− µt+1
)
Kct +D
c
t = (σ + η)
(
αAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
Dt = (1− σ − η)
(
θAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
+Dct
Complementarity slackness condition Dct ≥ 0, µt ≥ 0, Dctµt = 0
Constrained social planner’s problem in section 2.3
The social planner maximizes
max
∑
βt
(
C1−γt
1− γ −
L1+χt
1 + χ
)
s.t.
Ct +K
c
t +K
u
t = Y
u
t + (1− δ)Kut−1 + Y ct + (1− δ)Kct−1
Kct ≤ (σ + η)
(
θY ct + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
after eliminating Lct and L
u
t using equations (2.21) and (2.22),
Y ut = (A
u)1/θ
(
Kut−1
)α/θ
L1−θt
(
(Ac)1/θ
(
Kct−1
)α/θ
+ (Au)1/θ
(
Kut−1
)α/θ)θ−1
Y ct = (A
c)1/θ
(
Kct−1
)α/θ
L1−θt
(
(Ac)1/θ
(
Kct−1
)α/θ
+ (Au)1/θ
(
Kut−1
)α/θ)θ−1
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To begin with, derive the FOCs of Y ut with regard to L
u
t , K
u
t and K
c
t
∂Y ut
∂Lt
= (1− θ) Y
u
t
Lut
Lut
Lt
= WtL
u
t /Lt
∂Y ut+1
∂Kut
=
α
θ
Y ut+1
Kut
+
α
θ
Y ut+1
Kut
(Au)1/θ (Kut )
α/θ (θ − 1)
(Ac)1/θ (Kct )
α/θ + (Au)1/θ (Kut )
α/θ
= rut+1/θ + r
u
t+1L
u
t+1/Lt+1 (1− 1/θ)
∂Y ut+1
∂Kct
=
α
θ
Y ct+1
Kct
(Au)1/θ (Kut )
α/θ (θ − 1)
(Ac)1/θ (Kct )
α/θ + (Au)1/θ (Kut )
α/θ
= rct+1L
u
t+1/Lt+1 (1− 1/θ)
The FOCs of Y ct are symmetric.
Denote the shadow prices λt, ωtλt for the two constraints, respectively. The
FOCs
0 =
∂Lt
∂Lt
= −Lχt +
∂Y ut
∂Lt
λt + (1 + (σ + η) θωt)
∂Y ct
∂Lt
λt
= −Lχt +Wt
Lut
Lt
λt + (1 + (σ + η) θωt)Wt
Lct
Lt
λt
= −Lχt + λtWt + (σ + η) θ
Lct
Lt
ωtλtWt
0 =
∂Lt
∂Kut
= −λt + λt+1
(
∂Y ut+1
∂Kut
+ (1− δ)
)
+ λt+1
∂Y ct+1
∂Kut
+ ωt+1λt+1 (σ + η) θ
∂Y ct+1
∂Kut
= −λt + λt+1
(
rut+1/θ + r
u
t+1L
u
t+1/Lt+1 (1− 1/θ) + (1− δ)
)
+ λt+1
(
rut+1L
c
t+1/Lt+1 (1− 1/θ)
)
+ ωt+1λt+1 (σ + η)
(
θrut+1L
c
t+1/Lt+1 (1− 1/θ)
)
= −λt +
(
rut+1 + (1− δ)
)
λt+1 − (σ + η)Lct+1/Lt+1 (1− θ) rut+1ωt+1λt+1
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0 =
∂Lt
∂Kct
= −λt − ωtλt + λt+1
∂Y ut+1
∂Kct
+ λt+1
(
∂Y ct+1
∂Kct
+ (1− δ)
)
+ ωt+1λt+1 (σ + η)
(
θ
∂Y ct+1
∂Kct
+ (1− δ)
)
= −λt + λt+1
(
rct+1L
u
t+1/Lt+1 (1− 1/θ)
)
+ λt+1
(
rct+1/θ + r
c
t+1L
c
t+1/Lt+1 (1− 1/θ) + 1− δ
)
− ωtλt + ωt+1λt+1 (σ + η)
(
θ
(
rct+1/θ + r
c
t+1L
c
t+1/Lt+1 (1− 1/θ)
)
+ (1− δ))
= −λt + λt+1
(
rct+1 + 1− δ
)
− ωtλt + (σ + η)
((
1− Lct+1/Lt+1 (1− θ)
)
rct+1 + (1− δ)
)
ωt+1λt+1
2.B Equation system for the two-sector extension
When the constraint is binding, the competitive equilibrium is characterized by 7
variables Wt,K
c
t ,K
u
t , L
c
t , L
u
t , Lt, Ct satisfying the following equations.
Wt = (1− θ)Ac
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
−θ
Wt = (1− θ)Au
(
Kut−1
)α
(Lut )
−θ
Wt
(
1− τLt
)
/
(
1 + τC
)
C−γt = L
χ
t
1 + τBt =
(
αAu (Kut )
α−1 (Lut+1)1−θ + (1− δ))β CγtCγt+1
Kct = (σ + η)
(
θAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
Ct+K
u
t +K
c
t = A
u
(
Kut−1
)
α (Lut )
1−θ+(1− δ)Kut−1+Ac
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ+(1− δ)Kct−1
Lct + L
u
t = Lt
The constrained social planner’s equilibrium is characterized by 10 variables
Wt,K
c
t ,K
u
t , L
c
t , L
u
t , Lt, Ct, ωt, r
c
t , r
u
t satisfying the following equations.
Wt = (1− θ)Ac
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
−θ
Wt = (1− θ)Au
(
Kut−1
)α
(Lut )
−θ
Wt (1 + (σ + η) θL
c
t/Ltωt)C
−γ
t = L
χ
t
1 =
(
rut+1 + 1− δ
)
β
Cγt
Cγt+1
(
1− (σ + η)L
c
t+1/Lt+1 (1− θ) rut+1ωt+1
rut+1 + 1− δ
)
rut = αA
u
(
Kut−1
)α−1
(Lut )
1−θ
1+ωt =
((
rct+1 + (1− δ)
)
+ (σ + η)
((
1− Lct+1/Lt+1 (1− θ)
)
rct+1 + (1− δ)
)
ωt+1
)
β
Cγt
Cγt+1
rct = αA
c
(
Kct−1
)α−1
(Lct)
1−θ
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Kct = (σ + η)
(
θAc
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ + (1− δ)Kct−1
)
Ct+K
u
t +K
c
t = A
u
(
Kut−1
)
α (Lut )
1−θ+(1− δ)Kut−1+Ac
(
Kct−1
)α
(Lct)
1−θ+(1− δ)Kct−1
Lct + L
u
t = Lt
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Chapter 3
Aging with Automation
Abstract: This chapter develops a dynamic model that combines demographic tran-
sitions, as in Gertler (1999), with endogenous automation. Following Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2018b), automation is modeled as the active replacement of labor with
capital at the task level in response to a rise in the relative cost of labor to capital,
leading to an endogenous increase in the capital share of output. It finds that al-
lowing automation to react endogenously to demographic and productivity changes
generates quantitatively relevant effects compared with the standard baseline where
firms cannot respond through the automation margin.
3.1 Introduction
The pressing issue of population aging in the industrialized economies stimulates
a large literature. However, few works incorporate its potential interactions with
automation, which is a widely discussed topic on its own. Rising life expectancy
and declining birth rate result in fewer workers supporting more retirees. Insufficient
workers are the concern1. At the same time, robots and artificial intelligence are
replacing human beings from manual tasks such as bolt tightening in an assembly
line to cognitive tasks such as real-time language translation. Workers outcompeted
by machines is the concern2.
This chapter aims to study the consequence of demographic transitions and au-
tomation as a whole. Firms actively choose to use capital to replace workers in more
tasks if the relative cost of labor to capital increases from aging. This endogenous
automation alleviates the negative impact of aging on economic growth and fiscal
sustainability. Aging, in turn, alleviates the downward pressure on wage growth of
automation from technology progress.
The framework is a flexible overlapping-generations model developed by Gertler
1For example, Gruber and Wise (1998); Blake and Mayhew (2006); Aslanyan (2014); Cooley and
Henriksen (2018); Docquier et al. (2019)
2For example, Autor et al. (2003); Goos and Manning (2007); Autor and Dorn (2013); Michaels
et al. (2014); Arntz et al. (2016); Graetz and Michaels (2018); Gregory et al. (2018)
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(1999). By introducing random transition from work to retirement and from re-
tirement to death, realistic life cycle and demographic transitions can be easily
calibrated with the transition probabilities. We introduce endogenous automation
into this framework and contrast the result to that when the automation channel is
off.
The endogenous automation follows the task-based approach developed by Ace-
moglu and Restrepo (2018b). More specifically, the final output is produced by
combining the outputs of various tasks. Tasks differ in their relative efficiency in
using capital and labor. For given relative cost of factors, some tasks are chosen
by the firms to produce with capital and the others with labor. Automation is the
process in which more tasks are produced by capital rather than labor when capital
becomes relatively cheaper than labor3.
The model is calibrated to the US to study the economic dynamics over the next
50 years. We find that leaving out automation underestimates the annual per capita
economic growth rate by 0.2 percentage points and overestimates the pension to
GDP obligations by 1 percentage point in 50 years. Automation does slow down
wage growth rate slightly in the beginning, but it accelerates wage growth later.
The capital share is expected to rise about 6 percentage points in 50 years, higher
than the 4 percentage points over the past 50 years4, with population aging and
technology progress.
This chapter contributes to two strands of largely independently developed lit-
erature. The framework follows Gertler (1999) and recent developments by Ferrero
(2010); Carvalho et al. (2016). It is more flexible than conventional overlapping-
generations models with a fixed life cycle. The automation part builds on the
microfoundation in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b), which originates from Zeira
(1998) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). With minimum simplification and func-
tional assumption, we make the automation channel quite tractable for quantitative
analysis. Abeliansky and Prettner (2017), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017b), and
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a) are three closely related papers on demographics
and automation. In their papers, the model is not brought to calibration directly
but means to provide insights for empirical tests. We complement this literature by
providing a calibrated dynamic model.
The rest of the chapter will be organized as follows: in Section Two, we set up
the model; in Section Three, we calibrate the model; in Section Four we discuss the
numerical results. Section Five concludes.
3For example, Lewis (2011); Manuelli and Seshadri (2014); Clemens et al. (2018)
4The declining of labor share over the past decades have been well documented by, for example,
Elsby et al. (2013); Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013).
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3.2 Model
The model comprises of three building blocks: the demographic block, the automa-
tion block, and the pension block. The demographic block is based on Gertler
(1999). The automation block is based on Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018b) with
two simplifications to facilitate analytical intuition and numerical calibration. The
pension block is simply about government financing pension with a payroll tax.
3.2.1 Demographics
Individuals evolve through two distinct stages of life: worker and retiree. A worker
retires with probability 1 − ωt at time t and becomes a retiree. A retiree dies with
probability 1 − γt. The retirement and death probabilities are independent across
the individuals. Denote variables of the workers with a superscript w and variables
of the retirees with a superscript r. The mass of workers at time t are Lwt and
retirees are Lrt . Each period ntL
w
t−1 mass of new workers join the working force as
newborn or immigrants. The law of motion of the workers and the retirees is the
following.
Lwt = ωtL
w
t−1 + ntL
w
t−1,
Lrt = γtL
r
t−1 + (1− ωt)Lwt−1.
The expected years of working is 1/ (1− ωt), and the expected life after retire-
ment is 1/ (1− γt). In this framework, an increase in longevity is a decrease in the
mortality rate 1 − γt. A decrease in newborns/immigrants is a decrease in nt. An
increase in the mandatory retirement age is a decrease in the retirement rate 1−ωt
and an increase in the death probability 1 − γt, keeping the expected total life of
working and retirement constant 1/ (1− ωt) + 1/ (1− γt).
Denote the old-age-dependency ratio Ψt ≡ Lrt/Lwt , it evolves as follows.
(ωt + nt) Ψt = γΨt−1 + (1− ωt)
The problem for a worker i consists of choosing consumption ci,t and asset ai,t
to solve
V wi,t = max
cwi,t,a
w
i,t
[(
cwi,t
)ρ
+ β
(
ωt+1V
w
i,t+1 + (1− ωt+1)V ri,t+1
)ρ]1/ρ
subject to
cwi,t + a
w
i,t = Rta
w
i,t−1 +W
w
t (1− τt)
or
awi,t−1 = 0
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if she is a new worker.
The preference is Epstein-Zin without risk-aversion on the retirement event. This
not only is convenient but also reflects the fact that the retirement event is highly
predictable in reality, although it is an artificial risk in the model. She derives
utility from current consumption cwi,t. Her value is a CES aggregation of current
consumption cwi,t and discounted future value ωt+1V
w
i,t+1 + (1− ωt+1)V ri,t+1, as a
worker or retiree. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 1/ (1− ρ).
The asset can be either physical capital or government bond. The two assets
pay the same gross return Rt by no-arbitrage if there is no risk in the capital return.
We assume so because we study the life-cycle consumption-saving decision. Denote
rt the rental rate of capital and δ the capital depreciation rate. The no-arbitrage
condition for time t is the following.
Rt+1 = rt+1 + (1− δ)
Each worker supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically. She receives a market wage
Wt and pays a payroll tax τt. If she is a new worker starting at period t, she carries
no assets awi,t−1 = 0. She chooses between consumption c
w
i,t and asset position a
w
i,t
with her income.
The consumption-saving choice for a retiree i, likewise, consists of choosing con-
sumption cri,t and assets a
r
i,t to solve
V ri,t = max
cri,t,a
r
i,t
[(
cri,t
)ρ
+ βγt+1
(
V ri,t+1
)ρ]1/ρ
subject to
cri,t + a
r
i,t =
Rt
γt
ari,t−1 +W
r
t
or
cri,t + a
r
i,t =
Rt
γt
awi,t−1 +W
r
t
if she retires in the current period.
A retiree does not work and survives with probability γt+1 to next period. She
receives a pension W rt when alive. The return on her investment is
Rt+1
γt+1
where Rt+1
is the interest rate. In essence, the retirees turn their wealth over to a perfectly com-
petitive mutual fund industry which invests the proceeds and pays back a premium
over the market return to compensate for the probability of death, as Blanchard
(1985) and Yaari (1965).
In Appendix 3.A we present the complete solution to the two optimization prob-
lems with a guess and verify approach. The propensity of consumption out of total
wealth turns out to be the same among the individuals of the same type, facilitating
aggregation greatly.
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The retiree’s consumption is a fraction of ξrt of the sum of wealth
Rt
γt
ari,t−1 (or
Rt
γt
awi,t−1 if she is just retired) and human capital H
r
t .
cri,t = ξ
r
t
(
Rt
γt
ari,t−1 +H
r
t
)
The retiree’s human capital is her pension plus the discounted future human
capital.
Hrt = W
r
t +
γt+1H
r
t+1
Rt+1
The consumption propensity ξrt evolves in the following way.
1
ξrt
= 1 + γtβ
1/(1−ρ)Rρ/(1−ρ)t+1
1
ξrt+1
Likewise, the worker’s consumption is a fraction ξwt of the sum of wealth Rta
w
i,t−1
and human capital Hwt .
cwi,t = ξ
w
t
(
Rta
w
i,t−1 +H
w
t
)
The worker’s human capital is her after-tax wage plus the discounted future
human capital as a worker or retiree, weighted by an adjusted probability accounting
for the two different stages.
Hwt = W
w
t (1− τt) +
(
ωt+1/Ω
w
t+1
)
Hwt+1 +
(
1− ωt+1/Ωwt+1
)
Hrt+1
Rt+1
where
Ωwt+1 = ωt+1 + (1− ωt+1)
(
ξwt+1
ξrt+1
)1/ρ−1
The consumption propensity ξwt evolves in the following way.
1
ξwt
= 1 + β1/(1−ρ)
(
Ωwt+1Rt+1
)ρ/(1−ρ) 1
ξwt+1
Denote Cwt , A
w
t , C
r
t , A
r
t the total consumption and asset position for the workers
and retirees respectively. The total wealth of the current workers are those who
remain workers from the last period ωtRtA
w
t−1 and the total human capital for both
the remaining and new workers Hwt L
w
t . Given the same propensity of consumption,
the law of motion for the aggregate consumption and asset position of the workers
is the following.
Cwt = ξ
w
t
(
ωtRtA
w
t−1 +H
w
t L
w
t
)
Awt = ωtRtA
w
t−1 +W
w
t L
w
t (1− τt)− Cwt
The total wealth of a retiree comprises three parts. The first part is the asset
of the surviving retirees γtA
r
t−1 multiplying the interest rate Rt/γt from the life
insurance scheme. The second part is the wealth from those workers who retire
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this period (1− ω)RtAwt−1. The third part is the human capital for the surviving
retirees Hrt L
r
t . Given the common propensity of consumption, the law of motion for
the aggregate consumption and asset position of the retirees is the following.
Crt = ξ
r
t
(
RtA
r
t−1 + (1− ωt)RtAwt−1 +Hrt ΨtLwt
)
Art = RtA
r
t−1 + (1− ωt)RtAwt−1 +W rt ΨtLwt − Crt
3.2.2 Automation
There is a representative firm. The final output Yt is produced by combining the
outputs from a continuum of measure one tasks Yj,t, j ∈ [0, 1] with unit elasticity of
substitution.
lnYt =
∫ 1
0
lnYj,tdj
If the marginal cost of production for task j is pj,t, using the final output as
numeraire, the optimal task input is
Yj,t = Yt/pj,t (3.1)
and the cost satisfy
0 =
∫ 1
0
ln pj,t. (3.2)
All the tasks are technologically automatable. A task can be produced either
with human labor lj,t or machines kj,t. It is worth noting that being technologically
automatable is not identical to being actually automated. The firm might not choose
to do so for economic reasons. The production function for task j is the following.
Yj,t = νjZ
L
t lj,t + ηjZ
K
t kj,t
The productivity of labor comprises a task-specific term νj and a common labor
augmenting technology ZLt . Likewise, the productivity of capital comprises a task-
specific term ηj and a common capital augmenting technology Z
K
t .
The firm hires labor at the market wage Wt and rents capital at the market
rate rt. The tasks are ranked such that the relative productivity of labor to capital
νj/ηj is increasing in its index j. So, there exists a threshold Jt such that above the
threshold, all the tasks are produced with labor, and below the threshold, all the
tasks are produced with machines. The tasks produced with machines are actually
automated. Formally,
Yj,t =
ηjZKt kj,t if j ≤ JtνjZLt lj,t if j > Jt (3.3)
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and Jt solves
νJt
ηJt
=
Wt/Z
L
t
rt/ZKt
. (3.4)
Jt is increasing in
Wt/ZLt
rt/ZKt
because νj/ηj is increasing in j. Intuitively, if the cost of
effective unit of labor (Wt/Z
L
t ) increases relative to the usage cost of effective unit
of capital (rt/Z
K
t ), the firm wants to replace labor with machines in more tasks.
More tasks are automated if there is a scarcity in the effective unit of labor (ZLt Lt)
or an abundance in the effective units of capital (ZKt Kt).
The marginal cost of production for each task j is
pj,t =

rt
ηjZKt
if j ≤ Jt
Wt
νjZLt
if j > Jt.
(3.5)
From the optimal task input (3.1), the optimal task production (3.3), and the
marginal cost of production for each task (3.5), eliminate pj,t and Yj,t and integrate,
we have the aggregate capital and labor used in production.
Kt−1 =
Yt
rt
Jt (3.6)
Lt =
Yt
Wt
(1− Jt) (3.7)
The total capital available for production in current period is predetermined
∫ 1
0 kj,t =
Kt−1.
Eliminate pj,t, rt,Wt from the price condition (3.2), the marginal cost of produc-
tion for each task (3.5), the total capital and labor used (3.6) and (3.7), we have the
aggregate production function in Cobb-Douglas form.
Yt = ZtK
Jt
t−1L
1−Jt
t (3.8)
where
lnZt =
∫ Jt
0
ln
(
ηjZ
K
t
Jt
)
dj +
∫ 1
Jt
ln
(
νjZ
L
t
1− Jt
)
dj. (3.9)
The measure of tasks automated Jt coincides with the capital share. Automation
has two interpretations in this model. At the micro-level, automation means more
tasks produced with capital. At the macro-level, automation means higher capital
share.
The TFP Zt is a complicated function of the measure of tasks automated Jt
following equation (3.9). However, it is not a perfect measure of productivity be-
tween production functions with different Jt, the measure of automation. From the
firm’s optimization problem, Jt is the optimal choice of automation. Therefore,
Z (Jt)K
Jt
t−1L
1−Jt
t > Z (J)K
J
t−1L
1−J
t ,∀J 6= Jt. Even an alternative choice of J might
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increase the TFP term Z (J) > Z (Jt), the output must be lower.
That all tasks are technologically automatable is our first simplification to Ace-
moglu and Restrepo (2018b). In their framework, the measure of technologically
automatable tasks could also grow, creating an extensive margin of automation.
However, the process is difficult to calibrate, and we leave it out.
From equation (3.4), the extent to which the measure of automated tasks Jt
increases with the relative labor cost Wt/rt (or more generally the relative effective
cost, adjusted the by the relative common term of productivity ZLt /Z
K
t ) depends on
the distribution of the relative task-specific productivity for each tasks νj/ηj . The
elasticity of automation can be defined as follows.
∂Jt
∂ (Wt/rt)
/
1− Jt
Wt/rt
It captures the fraction of tasks to be automated out of the existing manual tasks
1− Jt for a marginal rise of the relative labor cost Wt/rt.
The automation elasticity is a constant if the relative task-specific capital to
labor productivity term has the functional form ηj/νj = (1− j)1/α where α > 0.
We assume so and will explain what it means.
From equation (3.4), the threshold is solved.
Jt = 1−
(
Wt/Z
L
t
rt/ZKt
)−α
(3.10)
The elasticity of automation is the constant α, fixing the common labor and capital
augmenting productivity ZLt and Z
K
t .
∂Jt
∂ (Wt/rt)
/
1− Jt
Wt/rt
= α
To understand the functional assumption, think about two cases: νj is a constant
or ηj is a constant. If νj = 1, the measure of tasks with task-specific capital produc-
tivity below η is ηα and the density of tasks with task-specific capital productivity η
is αηα−1. For α < 1, the density is higher for tasks with low task-specific capital pro-
ductivity. Otherwise, the density is higher for tasks with high task-specific capital
productivity. Alternatively, if ηj = 1, the measure of tasks with task-specific labor
productivity below ν is 1 − (1/ν)1/α. It is a Pareto distribution with a coefficient
1/α.
The functional assumption does not impose any restrictions on the functional
form of νj or ηj itself. Following the assumption and using the equation (3.9), we
have
lnZt = Jt ln
(
ZKt /Jt
)
+(1− Jt) ln
(
ZLt / (1− Jt)
)
+1/α
∫ Jt
0
ln (1− j) dj+
∫ 1
0
ln νjdj.
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For any distribution of νj (which indirectly determines ηj from ηj/νj = (1− j)1/α),
it only enters the TFP term as a constant.
Importantly, the system is observationally equivalent to that assuming νj = 1.
To see this, we only need to normalize the common labor and capital augment-
ing productivity term by a time-invariant constant Z˜Kt = Z
K
t /e
∫ 1
0 ln νjdj and Z˜Lt =
ZLt /e
∫ 1
0 ln νjdj . The TFP term becomes
lnZt = Jt ln
(
Z˜Kt /Jt
)
+ (1− Jt) ln
(
Z˜Lt / (1− Jt)
)
+ 1/α
∫ Jt
0
ln (1− j) dj. (3.11)
For ease of notation, we omit the tilde as long as it does not cause any confusion.
The functional form assumption is our second simplification to Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2018b) framework. We make this assumption in order to bring their
theoretical framework to numerical analysis.
Three equations can summarize the representative firm’s aggregate production
function with automation: the Cobb-Douglas production function (3.8), the automa-
tion channel (3.10) and the TFP expression (3.11).
If the automation channel is shut down by imposing a further constraint Jt = J
on the firm, the aggregate production function is still Cobb-Douglas with expression
(3.8), (3.11) and the binding constraint Jt = J . It degenerates to a conventional
specification of the production function.
3.2.3 Pension and market clearing conditions
The government runs a balanced budget to finance the repayment of debt RtBt−1and
the pension W rt ΨtL
w
t obligation from the issuance of new bond Bt and payroll tax
τt on the wage income
5 from the workers WtL
w
t .
Bt + τtWtL
w
t = RtBt−1 +W
r
t ΨtL
w
t
The government maintains its debt at a fixed fraction of GDP.
Bt = ζ
BYt
A retiree receives the state pension as a fixed fraction of the worker’s net wage.
ζr is the net pension replacement rate.
W rt = ζ
r (1− τt)Wwt
5It is identical to a lump sum tax as the labor supply is exogenous.
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The asset market clears6.
Awt +A
r
t = Kt +Bt
By Walras Law, the goods market clears.
Yt = C
w
t + C
r
t +Gt +Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1
The equation system that characterizes the equilibrium is summarized in Ap-
pendix 3.B.
3.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the US annually. The depreciation rate δ is 10%. The
coefficient ρ is set to −1, and this makes the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
to be 0.5. Low value like this is standard in the public finance literature.
The elasticity of automation is calibrated indirectly through the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor. From the transformation (dJ) / (1− J) =
Jd ln((1− J) /J) and the Cobb-Douglas production function property (1− Jt) /Jt =
(WtLt) / (rtKt), the elasticity of automation relates to the elasticity of the substitu-
tion between capital and labor in the following way.
α = Jt (σt − 1)
where σt is the elasticity of substitution σt ≡ ∂ ln (Lt/Kt) /∂ ln (rt/Wt).
The functional assumption requiring α > 0 is only consistent with a larger than
unit elasticity of substitution between capital and labor σ > 1. For the purpose of
calibrating the automation elasticity indirectly, the proper elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor σ should be the long-run elasticity, and the capital should
include highly labor-substitutable robots. It could be larger than many estimates
of σ in the literature. Nonetheless, there are a few recent papers conclude that the
elasticity is larger than one σ > 1. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) estimates
σ ≈ 1.2 ∼ 1.4. The median 1.3 is used in the numerical analysis. The corresponding
automation elasticity α = 40%× (1.3− 1) as the US capital share is 40%.
The US net pension replacement rate ζr is 47%. The national debt to GDP ratio
ζB is set to 33%. While at a first glance the US national debt to GDP is close to
100% as of 2018, about 2/3 were held by the Fed, US government and foreigners.
The demographic transition lasts 50 years. Initially, the probability of retiring
1−ω is 1/45. There are 45 years of working on average. If an average worker starts
working at 20, he/she retires at the age of 65, which is typical for the US. The
6There will be missing one equation in the system using the (current period) asset market clearing
condition rather than the goods market-clearing condition
85
mortality rate 1− γ is calibrated to 1/15. The worker lives for another 15 years on
average after retirement. This makes the total life to be 80, which is slightly higher
than the recent US life-expectancy 79. The sum of newborns (directly to working
age) and immigrants are set to 1− ω + 1% of the worker population. This leads to
a steady-state population growth rate of 1% as in the past decades. In the end of
next 50 years, the probability of retiring is unchanged. But the mortality rate 1− γ
becomes 1/20. On average, there are 5 years more life. The sum of newborns and
immigrants are set to 1 − ω + 0.1%, so the worker population only grows at 0.1%
annually. The transition is smooth such that the value of ω, γ, n changes linearly
over the 50 years.
The growth rate of the labor augmenting technology (ZLt ) and the capital aug-
menting technology (ZKt ) are calibrated to yield a 2% steady-state output per capi-
ta growth if the capital share is fixed at 40%. The capital augmenting technology
growth rate is set to be 1%. Then the labor augmenting technology growth is 1.33%.
This means that capital-augmenting technology growth contributes to about 1/3 of
the overall growth. It is a conservative number consistent with the low end of the es-
timated contribution of the investment-specific technological progress to the overall
growth in Greenwood and Krusell (2007).
The model does not admit a balanced growth path unless the automation chan-
nel is shut down. To approximate the initial (detrended) capital stock and asset
position, we assume the economy starts from the detrended steady state of an artifi-
cial economy without automation. In the artificial economy, the representative firm
faces an extra constraint Jt = 40%, which is the recent value for the US, and the
demographic coefficients are at the initial level as aforementioned, which are also
the recent value for the US. The discount factor β = 0.998 is then calibrated by
targeting a 4% annual real interest rate in the US on the balanced growth path7.
The initial level of the relative size of the capital and labor augmenting technology
ZK1 /Z
L
1 = 3.92 is calibrated to target the 40% capital share on the balanced growth
path.
The calibration is summarized in Table 3.1.
7A value β close to unity is consistent with the micro evidence in Hurd (1990).
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Table 3.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
δ 10% Depreciation rate
1/(1− ρ) 0.5 Intertemporal Elasticity of substitution
ζr 47% Net pension replacement rate
ζB 33% US national debt to GDP, by US private investors
gZ
K
1% Capital-augmenting technology growth rate
gZ
L
1.33% Labor-augmenting technology growth rate
α 0.12 Elasticity of automation
1− ω 1/45 Probability of retiring
1− γt 1/15→ 1/20 Mortality rate
ω + nt − 1 1%→ 0.1% Growth rate of the worker population
β 0.998 Discount rate, targeting R = 1.04
ZK1 /Z
L
1 3.92 Initial relative productivity, targeting J = 40%
3.4 Numerical Analysis
The perfect foresight model is solved globally using a slightly modified relaxation
algorithm, with details in Appendix 3.D. Figure 3.1 shows the transition dynamics
over 50 years driven by aging, capital-augmenting technology progress and labor-
augmenting technology progress. The blue solid lines are for the aging economy with
automation. For comparison, the red dashed lines are for the aging economy with the
automation channel shut down by imposing an additional constraint Jt = 40% for
the representative firm’s problem. The upper panel presents the transition dynamics
of the real interest rate, capital share, pension obligation as a fraction of GDP. The
lower panel presents the log output per capita, log capital stock per capita, and log
wage, all removing a 2% trend.
1 25 50
1.03
1.035
1.04
1.045
1 25 50
0.4
0.42
0.44
0.46
1 25 50
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
1 25 50
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
1 25 50
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1 25 50
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
w/ automation
w/o
Figure 3.1: Transition dynamics
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For the aging economy without automation (shown in red dashed lines), the in-
terest rate falls by slightly less than 1 percentage point over 50 years, driven by the
desire to save for the longer retirement. The capital share is fixed as constant by
definition. The pension obligation rises by more than 2 percentage points of GDP
as there are more pension receivers relative to workers from population aging over
time. The output per capita grows a little bit faster than 2% initially while even-
tually falls below. The same is true for the capital. There are two counteracting
forces here. Each worker is expected to live longer, so they would like to increase
investment, which boost capital per worker and output per worker. However, the
retiree population increases over time relative to the worker population. It drives
down per capita values of output and capital. The second force only kicks in grad-
ually. Therefore, the output and capital per capita rises above trend initially and
drops below later. The wage rises by about 4 percentage points above trend over 50
years. The upward trend comes from the fact that longevity and low birth rate lead
to higher capital to labor ratio, and hence, labor becomes relatively scarce.
Taking automation into consideration (shown in blue solid lines) yields different
transition dynamics. The aging and capital-augmenting technology change induce
the firm to replace labor with machines in more tasks. Capital share is 6 percentage
points higher. As capital is more useful, the interest rate is 1 percentage point
higher. This induces more investments and the capital per capita is 20 percentage
points higher. Output per capita is 10 percentage points higher with more capital
and more efficient usage of the shrunk labor force in the unautomated tasks. Wage
is less than 1 percentage point lower with automation as labor is less scarce. The
pension obligation as a fraction of GDP is 1 percentage points lower as the economy
is larger.
The differences are quantitatively relevant. By incorporating automation, the
interest rate increases slightly, suggesting that aging with automation cannot explain
much about a secular fall in the real interest rate. The increase of the capital share
in the next 50 years is even larger in magnitude than the 4 percentage points over the
past 50 years. Dividing the 10-percentage point difference in output per capita by
50 years, missing automation underestimates the output per capita annual growth
rate by 0.2 percentage points. Likewise, the capital per capita annual growth rate
is underestimated by 0.4 percentage points leaving out automation.
The capital-augmenting technology growth and aging reinforce each other in
driving the difference. Figure 3.2 plots for either channel the log of output per
capita deviation of the economy modeling automation from that not modeling. The
capital augmenting technology growth alone leads to 7 percentage points higher
output per capita over the 50 years, as shown in the red dashed line. Automation
allows the economy to exploit more of the productivity gain of capital by using it
more intensively in more tasks. Aging alone leads to less than 1 percentage point
output per capita difference, as shown in the yellow dotted line. Combining the two
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Figure 3.2: Effect of automation for different exogenous shocks
channels generates a larger effect than the sum of the two effects. On the one hand,
aging further increases the degree of automation, making the output more sensitive
to capital augmenting technology. On the other hand, automation driven by capital
augmenting technology growth further mitigates the labor shortage from aging and
improves output.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of automation for different policies
The rising pension obligation motivates policies such as the transition from the
pay as you go system to a fully funded system or an increase in the retirement age.
Figure 3.3 plots for the two different policies the log of output per capita deviation
of the economy modeling automation from that not modeling. More specifically, the
moving from the pay as you go system to the fully funded system is modeled as a
decline in the replacement rate of pension financed by the payroll tax. The replace-
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ment rate decreases to half of the original linearly over 50 years. In our calibration,
it decreases from 40% to 20%. It results in higher savings by the household. As we
do not differentiate between the government saving on behalf of the household and
the household saving directly, it could also be interpreted as a partial replacement
by the fully funded pension system. The rising mandatory retirement age is modeled
with a decrease in the probability of retirement 1− ω and an increase in the prob-
ability of mortality 1 − γ, while keeping the average total working and retirement
life 1/ (1− ω) + 1/ (1− γ) constant. The policy increases ω linearly from 1 − 1/45
to 1− 1/50 while keeping the years spent in retirement fixed.
The partial transition from the pay as you go to the fully funded pension system
results in 1 percentage point higher output per capita deviation from automation. By
contrast, the higher mandatory retirement age narrows the deviation by 1 percentage
point. This is because the first policy increases the saving demand and drives up
automation by 1 more percentage point, and the second reduces the saving demand
so that it slows down automation slightly. Modeling automation is thus also relevant
for policy evaluations with regard to aging.
The results are robust to different specification of the elasticity of automation
and the capital augmenting technology growth rate. Roughly speaking, cut the
elasticity of automation by half or cut the capital augmenting technology growth
rate by half leads to about half the effects. They are still quantitatively relevant.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides a convenient framework to combine rich demographic tran-
sitions with microfounded automation. We find that allowing automation to react
endogenously to demographic and productivity changes is quantitatively relevant for
economic forecasting. Aging research missing the automation channel can underes-
timate economic growth and overestimate the fiscal burden. Automation research
missing aging can overstate the impact on wage. This framework may also serve as
a laboratory for policy evaluations.
Several directions of further research appear fruitful. First, an elastic labor
supply can be incorporated into the model. This allows a sharper analysis of the net
impact on employment. Second, the automation elasticity is a key parameter worth
further exploration. From the theoretical side, allowing the elasticity of substitution
between task outputs to be different than one leads to an aggregate production
function of the CES form. The elasticity of automation can be calibrated separately
to the elasticity of substitution. From the empirical side, direct identification of the
automation elasticity is yet to be done.
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Appendices
3.A Solution to the demographic block
The retiree’s problem
The first-order condition with respect to asset accumulation for a retiree is
(
cri,t
)ρ−1
= βγ
(
V ri,t+1
)ρ−1 ∂V ri,t+1
∂ari,t
.
The envelope condition is
∂V ri,t
∂ari,t−1
=
(
V ri,t
)1−ρ (
cri,t
)ρ−1 Rt
γ
.
The resulting Euler equation takes the standard form
cri,t = (βRt+1)
− cri,t+1,
where  ≡ (1− ρ)−1 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Guess that the consumption is a fraction of total wealth,
cri,t = ξ
r
t
(
Rt
γ
ari,t−1 +H
r
t
)
,
where Hrt represent the present discounted value of current and future pension
that is independent of individual-specific characteristics:
Hrt = W
r
t +
γHrt+1
Rt+1
.
Substitute the guess into the Euler equation yields a law of motion for the
marginal propensity to consume of a retiree ξrt ,
ξrt
(
Rt
γ
ari,t−1 +H
r
t
)
= (βRt+1)
− ξrt+1
(
Rt+1
γ
ari,t +H
r
t+1
)
.
Substitute the guess into the budget constraint of a retiree and use the recursive
expression of Hrt to eliminate W
r
t leads to express assets as
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ari,t +
γHrt+1
Rt+1
= (1− ξrt )
(
Rt
γ
ari,t−1 +H
r
t
)
.
Combining the last two expressions gives a non-linear first-order difference equa-
tion for the marginal propensity to consume of the form
1
ξrt
= 1 + γβR−1t+1
1
ξrt+1
.
Moreover, guess that the value function is linear in consumption according to
V ri,t = ∆
r
t c
r
i,t.
Then, from the Bellman equation,
(
∆rt c
r
i,t
)ρ
=
(
cri,t
)ρ
+ γβ
(
∆rt+1c
r
i,t+1
)ρ
.
Substituting for the consumption Euler equation and simplifying yields
(∆rt )
ρ = 1 + γβR−1t+1
(
∆rt+1
)ρ
.
From the difference equation of consumption propensity,
ξrt = (∆
r
t )
−ρ .
The worker’s problem
The first-order condition with respect to asset accumulation for a worker is
(
cwi,t
)ρ−1
= β
[
ωV wi,t+1 + (1− ω)V ri,t+1
]ρ−1(
ω
∂V wi,t+1
∂awi,t
+ (1− ω) ∂V
r
i,t+1
∂awi,t
)
.
The envelope conditions are
∂V wi,t
∂awi,t−1
=
(
V wi,t
)1−ρ (
cwi,t
)ρ−1
Rt
and
∂V ri,t
∂awi,t−1
=
(
V ri,t
)1−ρ (
cri,t
)ρ−1
Rt.
The return for a new retiree is Rt rather than
Rt
γa .
Guess that the old worker’s value function has the same form
V wi,t = ∆
w
t c
w
i,t.
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The Euler equation then becomes
(
βΩwt+1Rt+1
)
cwi,t = ωc
w
i,t+1 + (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)
cri,t+1.
where
Ωwt+1 = ω + (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ
.
Substitute the guesses into the Bellman equation
(
∆wt c
w
i,t
)ρ
=
(
cwi,t
)ρ
+ β
[
ω∆wt+1c
w
i,t+1 + (1− ω) ∆rt+1cri,t+1
]ρ
.
Combining it with the Euler equation gives
(∆wt )
ρ = 1 + β
(
Ωwt+1Rt+1
)−1 (
∆wt+1
)ρ
.
Guess that consumption of the worker is also a fraction of total wealth.
cwi,t = ξ
w
t
(
Rta
w
i,t−1 +H
w
t
)
where Hwt represent the present discounted value of current and future human
wealth that is independent of individual-specific characteristics:
Hwt = W
w
t (1− τt) +
ωHwt+1 + (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ
Hrt+1
Ωwt+1Rt+1
.
Substitute the guesses and the decision rule for a retiree into the Euler equation
gives
(
βΩwt+1Rt+1
)
ξwt
(
Rta
w
i,t−1 +H
w
t
)
= ωξwt+1
(
Rt+1a
w
i,t +H
w
t+1
)
+ (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)(
∆rt+1
)−ρ (
Rt+1a
w
i,t +H
r
t+1
)
= Ωwt+1Rt+1ξ
w
t+1
awi,t + ωHwt+1 + (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ
Hrt+1
Ωwt+1Rt+1

+ (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ ((
∆wt+1
)−ρ − ξwt+1) (Rt+1awi,t +Hrt+1) ,
where the definition of Ωwt+1 is used in the last equation.
Substitute the guesses into the budget constraint gives
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awi,t +
ωHwt+1 + (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ
Hrt+1
Ωwt+1Rt+1
= (1− ξwt )
(
Rta
w
i,t−1 +H
w
t
)
.
Combining the last two equations,
1
ξwt
= 1+β
(
Ωwt+1Rt+1
)−1 1
ξwt+1
−
(1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ ((
∆wt+1
)−ρ − ξwt+1)(Rt+1awi,t +Hrt+1)
Ωwt+1Rt+1ξ
w
t+1ξ
w
t
(
Rtawi,t−1 +H
w
t
) .
Comparing with the difference equation of ∆wt , the propensity of consumption
is simply
ξwt = (∆
w
t )
−ρ .
3.B System of equations
Given exogenous ZKt , Z
L
t , an equilibrium is characterized by the following 22 equa-
tions.
The workers
Cwt = ξ
w
t
(
ωRtA
w
t−1 +H
w
t L
w
t
)
(3.12)
Awt = ωRtA
w
t−1 +W
w
t L
w
t (1− τt)− Cwt (3.13)
Hwt = W
w
t (1− τt) +
ωHwt+1 + (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ
Hrt+1
Ωwt+1Rt+1
(3.14)
Ωwt+1 = ω + (1− ω)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ
(3.15)
(∆wt )
ρ = 1 + β
(
Ωwt+1Rt+1
)−1 (
∆wt+1
)ρ
(3.16)
ξwt = (∆
w
t )
−ρ (3.17)
The retirees
Crt = ξ
r
t
(
RtA
r
t−1 + (1− ω)RtAwt−1 +Hrt ΨtLwt
)
(3.18)
Art = RtA
r
t−1 + (1− ω)RtAwt−1 +W rt ΨtLwt − Crt (3.19)
Hrt = W
r
t +
γHrt+1
Rt+1
(3.20)
(∆rt )
ρ = 1 + γβR−1t+1
(
∆rt+1
)ρ
(3.21)
ξrt = (∆
r
t )
−ρ (3.22)
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The firms
Rt+1 = Zt+1Jt+1 (Kt)
Jt+1−1 (Lwt+1)1−Jt+1 + 1− δ (3.23)
rt = ZtJt (Kt−1)Jt−1 (Lwt )
1−Jt (3.24)
Wwt = Zt (1− Jt) (Kt−1)Jt (Lwt )−Jt (3.25)
Yt = ZtK
Jt
t−1 (L
w
t )
1−Jt (3.26)
The automation
Jt = 1−
(
Wt/Z
L
t
rt/ZKt
)−α
(3.27)
lnZt = Jt ln
(
ZKt
Jt
)
+ (1− Jt) ln
(
ZLt
1− Jt
)
− 1
α
((1− Jt) ln (1− Jt) + Jt) (3.28)
The government budget constraint
Bt = RtBt−1 +W rt ΨtL
w
t − τtWwt Lwt (3.29)
Bt = ζ
BYt (3.30)
W rt = ζ
r (1− τt)Wwt (3.31)
The resource constraint
Yt = C
w
t + C
r
t +Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 (3.32)
The labor market dynamics
(ω + n) Ψt = γΨt−1 + (1− ω) (3.33)
3.C Existence of a balanced growth path
There exists a balanced growth path if gZ
K
t → 0 asymptotically. To see this, from
equation (3.27), (3.28), (3.24), (3.25)
gW = gZ
L − gZK
gZ = JgZ
K
+ (1− J) gZL
gZ = (1− J) (gK − gL)
gW = gZ + J
(
gK − gL)
So,
gZ = 0
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gW = gK − gL = gZL
gZ = (1− J) gZL
If a balanced growth path exists, we can detrend the variables so that they
converge to a steady-state. More specifically, define the effective labor augmenting
productivity Zt ≡ (Zt)1/(1−Jt). Denote variables with a check the variables de-
trended by the number of workersXˇt ≡ Xt/ZLt . Denote variables with a hat the
variables detrended by the number of workers and the labor augmenting productiv-
ity growth Xˆt ≡ Xt/
(
ZLt L
w
t
)
. The equilibrium is characterized alternatively by the
22 detrended variables Cˆwt , Aˆ
w
t , ξ
w
t ,∆
w
t ,Ω
w
t , Cˆ
r
t , Aˆ
r
t , ξ
r
t ,∆
r
t , Rt, rt, Wˇ
w
t , Wˇ
r
t , Hˇ
w
t , Hˇ
r
t ,
Kˆt,Ψt, Yˆt, Bˆt, τt, Jt, Zˇ
L
t that satisfy the following 22 equations.
The workers
Cˆwt = ξ
w
t
(
ωtRtAˆ
w
t−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
+ Hˇwt
)
(3.34)
Aˆwt =
ωtRtAˆ
w
t−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
+ Wˇwt (1− τt)− Cˆwt (3.35)
Hˇwt = Wˇ
w
t (1− τt) +
ωt+1Hˇ
w
t+1 + (1− ωt+1)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ
Hˇrt+1
Ωwt+1Rt+1
(
1 + gZ
L
)
(3.36)
Ωwt+1 = ωt+1 + (1− ωt+1)
(
∆rt+1
∆wt+1
)1−ρ
(3.37)
(∆wt )
ρ = 1 + β
(
Ωwt+1Rt+1
)−1 (
∆wt+1
)ρ
(3.38)
ξwt = (∆
w
t )
−ρ (3.39)
The retirees
Cˆrt = ξ
r
t
(
RtAˆ
r
t−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
+
(1− ωt)RtAˆwt−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
+ Hˇrt Ψt
)
(3.40)
Aˆrt =
RtAˆ
r
t−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
+
(1− ωt)RtAˆwt−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
+ Wˇ rt Ψt − Cˆrt (3.41)
Hˇrt = Wˇ
r
t +
γt+1Hˇ
r
t+1
(
1 + gZ
L
)
Rt+1
(3.42)
(∆rt )
ρ = 1 + γt+1β
R−1t+1
(
∆rt+1
)ρ
(3.43)
ξrt = (∆
r
t )
−ρ (3.44)
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The firms
Rt+1 = Jt+1
(
Kˆt(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt+1 + nt+1)
)Jt+1−1 (Zˇt+1)1−Jt+1 + 1− δ (3.45)
rt = Jt
(
Kˆt−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
)Jt−1 (Zˇt)1−Jt (3.46)
Wˇwt = (1− Jt)
(
Kˆt−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
)Jt (Zˇt)1−Jt (3.47)
Yˆt =
(
Kˆt−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
)Jt (Zˇt)1−Jt (3.48)
The automation
Jt = 1−
(
Wˇwt
rt/ZKt
)−α
(3.49)
(1− Jt) ln Zˇt = Jt ln
(
ZKt
Jt
)
+ (1− Jt) ln
(
1
1− Jt
)
− 1
α
((1− Jt) ln (1− Jt) + Jt)
(3.50)
The government budget constraint
Bˆt =
RtBˆt−1
gZL (ωt + nt)
+ Wˇ rt Ψt − τtWˇwt (3.51)
Bˆt = ζ
BYˆt (3.52)
Wˇ rt = ζ
r (1− τt) Wˇwt (3.53)
The resource constraint
Yˆt = Cˆ
w
t + Cˆ
r
t + Kˆt −
(1− δ) Kˆt−1(
1 + gZL
)
(ωt + nt)
(3.54)
The labor market dynamics
(ωt + nt) Ψt = γtΨt−1 + (1− ωt) (3.55)
3.D Solution algorithm
The equilibrium can be solved globally by the relaxation algorithm. For perfect fore-
sight model, the equation system such as 3.B can be summarized as ft (Xt+1, Xt, Xt−1) =
0 where Xt is the vector of endogenous variables at time t. If X1 and XT+1 are
known, the full transition paths X2 to XT can be solved from the large equation
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system ft (Xt+1, Xt, Xt−1) = 0 for t = 2 to T . There are efficient ways to solve
the large equation system. XT+1 is known for large T if the system converges to a
steady-state or a balanced growth path.
In our original problem gZ
K
t = g
ZK > 0, ∀t. A balanced growth path does not
exist according to section 3.C. To use the relaxation method, we solve an alternative
problem such that for large T the capital augmenting technology stops growing
gZ
K
t = 0,∀t ≥ T+1. A balanced growth path exists for the alternative problem. The
solution to the alternative problem using the relaxation method can be arbitrarily
close to the original problem if T is large enough.
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